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Abstract 
Participatory processes are increasingly sought (internationally and nationally) in natural resource 
and environmental decision-making to embrace different interests, values and knowledge. In Zambia, 
public participation is anchored on the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP). The decentralisation 
policy provides for the creation of grassroots structures (herein public spheres) for “people spirited 
participation.” Public participation in Solid Waste Management (SWM) in the country is thus 
[supposed to be] premised on decentralisation. Different grassroots structures have been formed to 
facilitate actors’ participation in waste management districts and zones. However, pursuing 
participatory approaches has not improved managing waste (particularly in Lusaka) where SWM has 
faced resistance from households. Hence this study explored practices in participatory processes and 
strived to understand how actors problematise SWM in Mtendere township in Lusaka. Qualitative 
data collection methods (interviews –individual and focus group – and field observations) were 
utilised in the inquiry. Relevant themes and patterns to theories and concepts used in the study were 
captured from interviews and formed the study results and a basis for analysis and discussion.     
Accounts of lived experiences in my study suggest that socio-economic, political affiliation, gender 
and age are used to exclude actors from participatory processes. Holders of different kinds of power 
(economic, political or expert) dominate grassroots spheres; making them seem forbidden to others. 
Politicisation of participatory spheres, information gaps (and rumours) and mistrust among actors 
have compounded the problem of SWM. However, although actors like households are often 
excluded from participatory processes, they are required to pay for managing waste. Households’ 
actions framed as “chikonko” (displeasure) by the waste collecting company and feelings that their 
(households) ideas are not appreciated typify SWM problematisation narratives. In seeking 
compliance to SWM systems, the Lusaka City Council introduced the Fast Track Court to prosecute 
SWM defaulters. Households have counteracted litigation through shielding each other and using 
dishonest and indiscriminate waste disposal means. Some methods of shielding others include paid-up 
households adding waste for non-paying neighbours to theirs; and paying workers for CBEs “small 
amounts” to collect unpaid for waste. The actions of mistrust deprive CBEs finances for efficient 
SWM. Mistrust in authorities and participatory process seem to have eroded actors’ confidence in 
participation. Largely, actors’ lived experiences are characterised by exclusion, frustrations, 
intimidation, arrests or convictions. 
Keywords: public participation, public sphere, decentralisation, power, trust 
2 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I thank all ‘co-authors’ (interviewees) of this study. These including 
households and Community Based Enterprise in Waste Management Zone 
11 in Mtendere, the Lusaka City Council and its units. Without your time, 
re-telling your lived experiences and interpreting the meaning of those 
experiences; this study would not have been a success. Ackim Kalikeka, I 
am grateful for your insightful ideas, assistance and commitment during the 
study. It is not by my mighty, but grace that I stayed put throughout my 
studies; praise be given to God. Many thanks go to the Swedish Institute 
(SI) for financing my studies in Environmental Communication and 
Management at Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences – Sveriges 
Lantbruksuniversitet (SLU). I am grateful to my programme coordinator 
and thesis supervisor Elin Ångman (PhD). Your encouragement, guidance 
and support motivated me to put my best into this study and the programme 
in general. To my three sweet girls (Constance, Rose and Camilla) tribute 
goes to your love, support and understanding. Utmost, I thank my parents 
for the virtues and values imparted in me. My sisters you stood by me from 
childhood, you helped me treasure learning and live with others; you will 
forever be my heroines. My friends who cheered me up during my studies 
and lonely thesis study, I am indebted to you.  
 
To you all, I am wholeheartedly thankful!! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ 1 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... 2 
Table of figures ................................................................................................................. 4 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... 5 
CHAPTER ONE .......................................................................................... 6 
1.0. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 6 
1.1. Research background ............................................................................................. 7 
1.2. Problem statement .................................................................................................. 7 
1.3. Study aims .............................................................................................................. 8 
1.4. Main research question ........................................................................................... 8 
1.5. Thesis structure....................................................................................................... 8 
CHAPTER TWO ......................................................................................... 8 
2.0. Materials and research methods ............................................................................. 8 
2.1. Study area overview ............................................................................................... 8 
2.2. Methodological approach ....................................................................................... 9 
2.3. Case study methodology......................................................................................... 9 
2.4. Pitfalls of case studies ............................................................................................ 9 
2.5. Data Collection Methods ........................................................................................ 9 
2.5.1. Semi-structured interviews ................................................................................... 10 
2.5.2. Observations ......................................................................................................... 10 
2.5.3. Focus group discussion......................................................................................... 10 
2.6. Ethical Considerations .......................................................................................... 10 
2.7. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) ................................................. 11 
2.8. De/limitations ....................................................................................................... 11 
CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................... 11 
3.0. Theoretical framework ......................................................................................... 11 
3.1. Literature review .................................................................................................. 11 
3.1.1. Public participation ............................................................................................... 12 
3.2. Habermasian Public Sphere Theory ..................................................................... 13 
3.3. Power ................................................................................................................... 14 
3.4. Trust ................................................................................................................... 15 
CHAPTER FOUR ...................................................................................... 16 
4.0. Results .................................................................................................................. 16 
4.1. Observations ......................................................................................................... 16 
4.2. Households ........................................................................................................... 17 
4.3. Community Based Enterprise ............................................................................... 18 
4.4. Lusaka City Council/Ward Development Committee .......................................... 19 
CHAPTER FIVE ........................................................................................ 20 
5.0. Analysis and discussion ........................................................................................ 20 
5.1. Public spheres: forbidden spaces? ........................................................................ 20 
5.2. “Who is talking?” ................................................................................................ 21 
5.3. Communication practices ..................................................................................... 22 
5.3.1. Acting on the message .......................................................................................... 23 
5.3.2. Changing the narratives ........................................................................................ 23 
5.4. Trade offs ............................................................................................................. 24 
4 
 
5.5. Degree of actors’ participation ............................................................................. 25 
5.6. Delinked ............................................................................................................... 26 
5.6.1. Practising what is on paper ................................................................................... 27 
5.7. Dis/trust and rumours ........................................................................................... 27 
5.7.2. Rebuilding trust .................................................................................................... 29 
CHAPTER SIX .......................................................................................... 30 
6.0. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 30 
6.1. Further research ideas ........................................................................................... 31 
References ................................................................................................... 32 
Appendix 1: Conceptual design of grassroots participation ....................... 38 
Appendix 2:  Interview guide –Waste Management Unit ............................ 38 
Appendix 3: Interview guide –Communications and Public Relations Unit ... 
   ............................................................................................................... 39 
Appendix 4: Interview guide –Ward Development Committee .................... 39 
Appendix 5: Interview guide –households ................................................... 40 
Appendix 6: Interview guide –Community Based Enterprise ...................... 41 
Appendix 7: summary of interviews with actors .......................................... 41 
7.1. Households ........................................................................................................... 41 
7.2. Community Based Enterprises –CBES ................................................................ 45 
7.3. Lusaka City Council –LCC .................................................................................. 48 
7.3.1. Ward Development Committee –WDC ................................................................ 50 
 
Table of figures 
 
Figure 1: Summary of actors’ problematisation of SWM ............................ 16 
Figure 2: Pictures 1 and 2 – roadway waste dumping in Mtendere; Picture 3 
– household waste burning at home; Picture 4 – Waste burning at 
CBE primary disposal site ............................................................... 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Abbreviations 
CBEs Community Based Enterprises  
GRZ Government of the Republic of Zambia  
IPA  Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis  
LCC Lusaka City Council  
MLGH Ministry of Local Government and Housing  
MP Member of Parliament  
NDP National Decentralisation Policy  
PP Public Participation  
SADC Southern Africa Development Community  
SWM Solid Waste Management 
UN United Nations  
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme  
WDCs Ward Development Committees  
WMDs Waste Management Districts  
WMZs Waste Management Zones 
 
  
6 
 
CHAPTER ONE  
1.0. Introduction  
Public participation (PP) is a buzzword and desirable practice 
internationally and locally such as under the UN Agenda 21 – UN (1992); 
Århus Convention – UNECE (1998); African and Regional Frameworks 
(SADC, 2010); and National Decentralisation Policy in Zambia 
(Government of Zambia [GRZ], 2013). It is more preferred in complex, 
uncertain and multi-scale problems that affect many actors (Renn, 2006). PP 
is underpinned by democratic worldviews such as participative and 
deliberative, which seek to transform attitudes and opinions towards the 
common good (Hansen, 2014; Pateman, 1970). It is premised on (inter alia) 
providing spaces for [re]building trust, deliberation or dialogue in crafting a 
society actors desire, (Raitio, 2012). In Zambia, decentralisation is regarded 
as a valuable step towards people’s efficient participation in public affairs 
for better informed and more legitimate decisions (GRZ, 2002). This is a 
shift from centrality governance that retained excessive power over citizens 
and restricted their participation to electing representatives (such as 
Members of Parliament).
1
 However, representatives’ failures to fully 
represent community needs disfranchised people from taking part [even] in 
electoral processes (Mutungwa, 2011). In seeking improved public 
involvement, Zambia has been transforming governance structures through 
local government reforms to create platforms for ordinary citizens to 
participate in planning and other processes (Zambia Diakonia, 2013).   
Decentralisation implementation by Lusaka City Council (LCC) is 
hence premised on participatory principles such as grassroots planning 
(LCC, 2008). Through participatory means, the council aims at mobilising 
people to participate in a more democratic planning manner. Grassroots 
involvement is regarded as one of the practical steps in devolving power, 
resources and functions from the centre to sub-district structures (LCC, 
2008). Ward Development Committees (WDCs) are some grassroots 
structures (see appendix 1) through which people’s views should be 
captured. The WDCs are responsible for facilitating grassroots participation. 
It is argued that substantial development is achievable when ordinary actors 
participate in planning and evaluating interventions meant to improve their 
well-being (Ministry of Local Government and Housing [MLGH] 2013). 
In pursuance of enhanced household participation in SWM at the 
grassroots, wards have been divided into Waste Management Zones 
(WMZs). Zones are seen as cardinal sub-structures for primary beneficiaries 
or those likely to be affected by any intervention to be involved in decision-
making or outcome evaluation of interventions  (MLGH 2013). Households 
can participate in zones as individuals or affiliates to community 
associations such as resident development committees. WDCs are required 
to work with households and waste collectors to develop waste management 
plans in zones. Further, WDCs can make decisions on certain issues and 
submit others to the council for higher level decision-making consideration.   
                                                          
1
 Shortly after gaining independence from Britain [in 1964],  Zambia’s first President 
Kenneth Kaunda banned multi-party democracy and public participation except in voting 
for leaders. In 1991, Zambia returned to multi-party democracy. However, the governance 
system remained grounded on representative democracy (Zambia Diakonia, 2013). 
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1.1. Research background  
SWM is problematic in Zambian cities. The situation is however 
worse in Lusaka due to its higher population stimulated by economic and 
social factors.  The city’s population growth rate is 3.7%, with a population 
of 2.8 million more than other cities. Kitwe, the second most populated city 
has 0.7 million people (Central Statistical Office, 2013). Lusaka’s high 
population has correlatively increased waste generation, constraining the 
council’s ability to manage it adequately. The city’s annual domestic and 
commercial waste generation is estimated to have risen by 141% [from 
220,000 metric tonnes] in 2000 to 530,000 metric tonnes in 2011; with per 
capita generation at 0.38kg/person/day
2
 (Ntambo, 2013). Less than 40% of 
the waste is collected and disposed at the landfills. Low waste collection 
rate has made the city littered with different sorts of waste attracting 
discontent among residents; earning it the “garbage city” cynicism (Shalala-
Mwale, 2012). Heaps of waste have become breeding sources for vectors. 
Households
3
 complain of flies transiting diseases after feasting on the waste. 
During the rainy season, drainages get blocked by the waste thus causing 
floods (Environmental Council of Zambia , 2004; LCC, 2007).  
1.2. Problem statement  
With SWM becoming remarkably problematic in Lusaka, the need for 
participatory SWM at policy, planning and execution levels was encouraged 
mainly through decentralisation (GRZ, 2013). In this view, the LCC formed 
structures and planning guidelines that consider PP an essential planning 
process instead of the top-down planning approach (LCC, 2008). 
Decentralisation is thus seen as a vehicle for increased public involvement 
in decision-making and finding valid outcomes and positions based on the 
“public spirit” rather than through aggregation mechanisms such as voting 
(LCC, 2008; Mutungwa, 2011). Objectives of decentralisation include 
empowering local communities by devolving decision-making authority; 
designing and implementing mechanisms to ensure grassroots integrated 
planning and budgeting; developing local authorities and communities’ 
capacity in development planning, financing and managing service delivery 
in their areas; and providing a legal and institutional framework to promote 
autonomy in decision-making at local level (GRZ, 2013).  
Despite pursuing participatory approaches, SWM has remained 
problematic and faces resistance from many residents resulting into 
cumulative uncollected waste that has made the city extremely dirty 
(Meulenbeek, 2011). Due to the problematic nature of SWM, less than 40% 
of the generated waste per month in the city is collected and aptly disposed; 
while the rest of it is burned, buried or dumped in drainages, open spaces 
and roadways, (Shalala-Mwale, 2012). The city’s sprawling peri-urban 
townships are the most littered with waste, leading to annual health and 
environmental risks such as outbreaks of diarrheal diseases, soil and water 
contamination (Chaampa, 2014). Thus, this study explored practices in 
                                                          
2
 Sweden generates 0.453/kg/person/day (EU, 2013) while USA generates 
2.0kg/person/day (Enviromental Protection Agency, 2013). 
3
A household here refers to a group of persons who normally eat and live together under the 
same roof (blood relatives or not) and make common provision for essential living needs 
and have one person heading the household (Central Statistical Office, 2012 ). 
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participatory processes in waste management and how actors problematise 
SWM in the context of PP in public spheres.  
1.3. Study aims 
The aim was threefold: firstly, explored participatory practices in 
SWM public spheres; secondly, examined how actors problematise the issue 
and what they think should be done to improve the situation; and thirdly,  
ascertained connections between resistance to waste management systems 
and exclusion from participatory processes. 
1.4. Main research question 
How do actors take part in participatory processes in Mtendere waste 
management district?   
1.4.1. Sub questions 
Q1. How are participatory processes facilitated in SWM? 
Q2. How does the LCC respond to emerging issues in SWM systems?  
Q3. How do households influence decision-making? 
Q4. How do actors describe trust in processes of PP and in others?   
1.5. Thesis structure 
Chapter 1 gives the problem background, research aims and questions. 
Chapter 2 focuses on research methodology and methods as Chapter 3 
synthesises the conceptual framework guiding the study. Chapter 4 presents 
the study findings while chapter 5 interprets and describes the implication of 
the findings.  Chapter 6 concludes the study. 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
 
2.0. Materials and research methods  
This chapter has three sections. The first section provides brief 
overview of the study area. The second one explains research methodology 
and methods; while the third focuses on data analysis method used to 
interpret the interviews contextual to concepts used in the study.  
2.1. Study area overview 
Mtendere township was established in 1967 as a government strategy 
to organise squatter settlements. The strategy was meant to relocate squatter 
settlers to more planned community with public services (Hansen, 1997). 
The township is divided into sections A, B, C, D and Extension. It has 
26,088 households and 125, 430 inhabitants (Central Statistical Office, 
2013). It is a low-income township with the majority of its residents 
occupying blue-collar jobs (trade and/or semi-skilled occupations such as 
cleaning or reception), and micro and small scale businesses with average 
household income of US$334.57 per month (FinMart Trust, 2009). Most 
income generating activities in Mtendere are micro and small scale informal 
trade businesses4. Households in informal businesses mainly sell second 
hand clothes, charcoal, vegetables, make carpentry and metal products or 
sewing apparels (Hansen, 1997; FinMart Trust, 2009).   
                                                          
4
Informality means the businesses are not registered with the Zambia Revenue Authority 
and do not pay tax as their revenue is below the tax threshold of US$200 (Shah, 2012). 
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2.2. Methodological approach  
This study is guided by the phenomenological worldview, which 
involves understanding and describing lived experiences as perceived by 
actors in a situation (Lester, 1999; Cresswell, 2014). The phenomenological 
epistemology is a qualitative approach that necessitates ‘suspending’ 
(‘bracketing’) taken-for-granted assumptions to gain insight into how actors 
perceive the situation, their motivations and actions in relation to their 
individual experiences (Schutz, 1967; Inglis, 2012). Typically, it utilises 
interviews, discussions and participant observations with emphasis on 
actors’ perspective and interpretation of the situation (Lester, 1999).    
This study was done in Mtendere Waste Management Zone (WMZ) 
11 for in-depth understanding of how and to what extent actors participate 
in public spheres. Actors’ views on practices in grassroots spheres provided 
valuable insight on their lived experiences for interpretation using analytical 
and theoretical arguments. A case study approach, which focuses on 
interactive social processes (Silverman, 2014) was utilised.  
2.3. Case study methodology 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon 
within its real-life context (Noor, 2008; Yin, 2009). Methods utilised in this 
inquiry were individual and focus group interviews, personal observations 
and documents (elaborated on below). These sources provided insightful 
realities and differences between what is planned for (in policy papers) and 
actual practices. A case study can be done on a community, organisation or 
process; placing emphasis on intensive examination of the setting in a case.  
Scholars define case study differently. Here it is used in reference to 
the study of a social phenomenon to develop descriptions and explanations 
to what is happening within and between social institutions (Yin, 2011; 
Cresswell, 2014). SWM in Mtendere was not chosen out of its unusualness; 
but it provided an important context for research aims and questions that 
sought insight and meaning construction on how actors problematise waste 
management, identify common narratives, and find philosophical reasons to 
situate those narratives and practices in participatory processes.  
2.4. Pitfalls of case studies  
Criticisms of case studies include time consumption and 
overwhelming data and/or the researcher allowing biased views shaping 
findings (Yin, 2009). Taking down notes immediately after interviews, 
transcribing recorded interviews on the day of interviews [or the following 
day] and thematising emerging patterns helped in managing time and data in 
a more systematic manner. Secondly, utilising varied forms of data 
including observations, documents and [semi-structured] individual and 
focus group interviews were vital in preventing data biasness. According to 
Shenton (2004), individual viewpoints and experiences can be collaborated 
with other sources to develop a rich picture of how individuals and groups 
perceive the same social phenomenon.  
2.5. Data Collection Methods  
Mtendere WMZ 11 was the research area. Actors interviewed in the 
zone were a Community Based Enterprise, WDC and households. At the 
council, I interviewed the Head of Waste Management, and Health and 
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Environmental Inspector; Communications and Public Relations Manager 
and Mtendere Peri-urban officer. Focus group discussions with households 
(randomly selected within the zone) were used in data collection. Twelve 
households and one CBE (waste collector) were interviewed. The number of 
household members per group interview was between 5 and 9. They 
included the young, adults and elderly who provided varied lived 
experiences on SWM. I also made observations in the zone. Various 
documents on participatory processes and SWM were obtained to 
supplement interviews and observations. Multiple data collection 
approaches are important for triangulating views about a phenomenon and 
patterns attributed to it (Shenton, 2004; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008).  
2.5.1. Semi-structured interviews  
Semi-structured interviews are flexible, offer wider response leeways 
and options to focus on important issues in the study (Bryman, 2004). They 
are mainly interviews aimed at producing knowledge that describes 
interviewees’ lived experience in the lifeworld and to interpret the meaning 
of the described phenomena (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008). Brinkmann 
(2013) contends that semi-structured interviews are suited for studying 
specific situations or validating data. Validation can be achieved by utilising 
different methods to compensate each method’s limitations in capturing 
shared experiences or emerging patterns about the phenomenon (Shenton, 
2004; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008).   
2.5.2. Observations 
This method is connected to behaviour studies in providing 
information about individuals’ habits and an intuitive understand of what is 
happening in a particular setup (Kombo & Tromp, 2006). Walking in WMZ 
11, I observed actions of households and CBEs on SWM. The method 
offered me an advantage to observe behavioural patterns directly. However, 
I needed to contextualise emerged patterns by exploring unclear issues with 
interviewees to gain better understanding, especially that encountering 
unexpected issues is common during observations (see Kothari (2004)). 
2.5.3. Focus group discussion 
Less structured group interviews were used to encourage households 
talk and exchange notes on SWM. Those who did not know certain issues 
sought clarity from others. Mostly men were less knowledgeable on many 
issues related to SWM and women provided clarity. Through clarifying 
issues and reminding each other during discussions, actors provided shared 
lived experiences and highlighted issues that might not have come out 
through other methods. For example, most men did not know waste 
collection fees and procedures when disposing waste at bins.  
2.6. Ethical considerations 
Some research ethical considerations I made were not to record 
unwilling interviewees and taking pictures. With victimisations being 
common in the township (as explained in chapter 4 –results), most 
households only accepted to talk on assurance that no recording will be 
done. Bryman (2004) puts it that caution should be taken against invasion of 
privacy, deception or causing harm to participants (physical/emotional). 
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Most households were also not willing to be photographed. They cited a 
case when their interview footage by ‘researchers’ was given to a television 
station and they were verbally victimised by the authority over their views.  
2.7. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
Understanding how people construct meaning of their lived 
experience in SWM was done using IPA. The IPA is a qualitative approach 
that focuses on understanding actors’ lived experience and their 
interpretation of those experiences (Kleiman, 2004). Interviews and 
observations were useful tools in understanding issues in SWM, how actors 
experience them, and generating themes on patterns of actors’ lived 
experiences. Interviewed age groups (youth, adults and the old) provided a 
spectrum of households’ accounts on SWM.  
The IPA entails being-in-the-world listening to actor’s every day 
narratives and reflections in their mundane world (lebenswelt) to interpret 
and understand their ways of perceiving and making sense of their life-
world – double hermeneutics5 (Schutz, 1967; Inglis, 2012). The themes and 
patterns that emerged formed results for the study and basis for analysis and 
discussion. Relating and linking the themes and patterns with theories 
(Löfgren, 2013) used in this study helped me develop in-depth descriptions 
of actors’ lived experiences in SWM. Campell (2011) states that an 
individual lived experience in the lifeworld in relation to theory and practice 
can be a reflection of society as a system and a lifeword. Hence, practices in 
SWM in Mtendere, narratives and lived experiences could be a reflection of 
commonly lived experiences in participatory processes in Lusaka. 
2.8. De/limitations  
Boundaries (delimitations) of this study were set by adopted theories (and 
key concepts), research aims and questions and chosen actors. One 
boundary that arose from chosen actors was the dissolution of WDCs at the 
time of the study by the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (where 
all councils belong). It limited access to multiple views from WDC 
members on SWM. Only the WDC trustee member was retained and 
available for interviews. Other limitations included non-availability of 
participatory processes to observe, households refusal to be recorded, and 
financial and time inadequacies.  
 
CHAPTER THREE 
3.0. Theoretical framework 
3.1. Literature review 
The theoretical starting point of this study is communication with a 
focus on practices in participatory public spheres. An interplay of trust and 
power in public spheres formed part of the concepts used. The study is 
situated in Environmental Communication through the analysis of practices 
in participatory processes towards policy and decision-making. 
                                                          
5
Double hermeneutic or dual interpretation process entails actors’ constructed meaning of 
their lifeworld and the researcher trying to interpret and understand actors’ meaning making 
of their lived experience (Smith & Osborn, 2008). 
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3.1.1. Public participation 
Participation is interpreted and pursued differently. Some scholars 
conceptualise it as an ideology, approach and culture while others as a 
method or guidelines to achieve a particular goal (whether the goal is to 
meet ‘participatory’ project requirements or consult people to sanction 
already made decision) –described as ‘transformative and instrumental’ 
participation (Pateman, 1970; Chambers, 1997). Practices considered 
‘participatory’ (in theory and practice) can be situated within a typology to 
differentiate the degree and kind of participation. In this study, the 
transformative (participative and deliberative –Pateman 1970) perspective 
of participation is utilised. Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation (as 
expanded on below) is used to place practices in participatory processes [in 
SWM] within a particular level of involvement. 
The transformative perspective of participation has participative and 
deliberative notions that seek to alter structural or institutional practices that 
lead to marginalisation and exclusion (Dahlberg, 2005; Pateman, 1970). It 
entails a shift from the notion of “professionals know best” to inclusion of 
grassroots’ knowledge in decision-making (Hansen, 2014; Juarez & Brown, 
2008). Smith (2003) contends that discursive processes provide for 
legitimised dialogical participation through non-coercive communication, 
which can reduce the distance between policy makers and citizens and 
increases possibilities for more engagement, ownership and control of the 
public spheres and practices within them. Participation is not a fixed notion; 
it is deeply embedded within complex realities. It is a struggle of ideologies 
and spheres to be involved, speak, and to be heard (Pateman, 1985). Access 
and interaction are important conditions in participation, which are based on 
the principle of providing actors spheres to be heard (Senecah, 2004). 
Participatory and deliberative processes are viewed to have many 
positive implications in complex and dynamic problems. SWM is among 
complex, uncertain and multi-scale environmental problems that affect 
many actors and agencies (Reed, 2008), thus requires multi-actor to improve 
its management. Involving varied actors in policy or decision-making could 
help fine-tune decisions to local contexts, which might minimise 
implementation hitches arising from oversights. It is argued that when 
seeking to improve community lives, including local actors (preferably from 
the beginning) could provide vital insights (such as losses or harms to local 
people or environment) planners could have overlooked (Corburn, 2003; 
Cox, 2010). There are however times when citizens are involved, but their 
views excluded by the authority during decision-making. In other situations, 
distortions (manipulation, coercion or misinformation) by the authority limit 
levels of deliberation to educating others (Depoe & Delicath, 2004). Despite 
problems and pitfalls in achieving participatory assured goals; its 
desirability cuts across many aspects including planning, decision-making 
or research (Lewin, 1946; Chambers, 1997).  
As stated above, households’ participation levels were assessed 
using Arnstein’s ladder of participation. The eight-rung ladder has non-
participation [manipulation and therapy], tokenism [informing, consultation 
and placation], and citizen power [partnership, delegated power and citizen 
control] as main participation typologies (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein regards 
manipulation and therapy as non-participation, but a way by powerholders 
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to ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ participants. Informing, consultation and placation 
rungs are tokenistic as they provide minimal power to participants to change 
things. Citizen power is on top of the ladder. It is underpinned by the degree 
of power for ‘have-nots’ to negotiate, make tradeoffs and have a stake in 
decision-making (Arnstein, 1969; Kessy, 2013).     
3.2. Habermasian Public Sphere Theory  
The public sphere concept was first developed in Jürgen Habermas’ 
1962 treatise (Thomas, 2005). It has a complex and long genealogical 
transformations; revealing criticisms and shifting meanings. Thus, it has 
many connotations among them political, social and philosophical. In this 
study, its use has political aspects of participatory spaces that [can] amplify 
public voices in forming public opinion (see Koçan (2008)). The concept’s 
roots were meeting places for the public to discuss and express their desires 
and needs without coercion (World Bank, 2009; Habermas, 1990 [1983]). 
The public sphere’s contested meanings and practical application are 
central to controversies about politics, society, rationality, and public life 
(Pinter, 2004). Its meanings and applications integrate and stimulate many 
discussions on normative [theoretical or practical] assumptions valuable for 
providing explanations to social change complexities and communication 
processes in democracies (Juarez & Brown, 2008; Pinter, 2004). Its 
conceptual form by Habermas is associated with democratic deliberations 
and their shortcomings (Pinter, 2004). According to Khan, et al (2012), the 
public sphere offers opportunities for citizens to act as a public body in an 
atmosphere that guarantees freedom of assembly and publishing opinions 
through communicative actions maintained by the manner public affairs are 
conducted.  
The origin of the bourgeois public sphere in social institutions and 
political philosophy was important for Habermas to draw the public sphere 
normative model and seek answers to questions about what makes 
democracy work (Mafuta, 2014; Carpentier, 2011). Democratic beliefs of 
the public sphere emphasise on the provision of public arenas where citizens 
talk, public views are collected by authorities and responsibilities assigned 
to some actor to ensure shared goals are achieved and feedback provided to 
others no matter the results (see Habermas, et al (1974)). Participatory 
practices in the public spheres are based on the principle of “public-ness” 
which symbolises a physical entity and “openness” and communicative 
actions embedded in the view of “marketplace ideas” that transform 
(otherwise) private people into a public through different ways of 
communication (Habermas, 1989; Thomas, 2005).  
The public sphere idea is central in participatory approaches through 
which people seek answers when they feel there are legitimacy deficits in 
existing policies, practices, or situations (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005; 
Habermas, et al., 1974). However, public sphere scholarship concedes that 
there are times when the public is reduced to spectators while expert 
opinions replace ‘true’ public opinion (Ubayasiri, 2006). It is argued that the 
efficiency of participatory processes depends on the extent of access (space 
to be heard); the degree of autonomy (actors’ freedom from coercion); the 
rejection of hierarchy (depoliticisation); the rule of law (subordination of the 
state); and the quality of participation (Rutherford, 2000). The principal aim 
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of the public sphere theory is to create shared communicative spaces that 
allow people think, talk and act together openly and with a commitment to 
make a difference in a particular community.  
Two-way communication between actors is envisaged in public 
spheres. But in situations where [for example] authorities publish 
information without listening to multiple publics; then the public sphere 
does not exist as discursive closures suppress particular views (World Bank, 
2009; Deetz, 1992). It is contended that marginalised groups [Frasian 
subaltern counterpublics –Fraser 1997] in the public sphere may form 
parallel discursive arenas, which could be interpreted as disobedience to 
deficits in democratic processes (Fraser, 1997; Markovits, 2005; von Essen, 
2016). Placing resistance within the democratic theory, Markovits (2005) 
argues that democratic disobedience to policy or decision by the public 
could signify democratic deficits and done in seeking correction of the 
deficits that threaten collective authorship of common goals.   
3.3. Power 
The concept of power is understood from varied perspectives 
including social, ideological, political, feminist or relational. In this study, it 
is used in reference to social power (power over and power to). Social 
power can be economic, authoritative or expert. Actors can use social power 
either for the common good or to coerce others. Oliga (1996) views social 
power as the ability to achieve common goals (power to) or to oppress and 
exploit others (power over). According to Giddens (1984), since some 
actors are privileged to access “allocative and authoritative resources” (have 
control over resources and people), they tend to create ‘them –us’ divisions 
and thereby exercise power over others. One of the implications of this 
phenomenon (them –us division) is the creation of skewed power relations 
that give some actors advantage to control interactions while limiting other 
actors’ participation (Foucault, 1991). Imbalanced power relations are 
typical in social power situations where ‘subjects’ are socialised to live 
within what exists even when it is unjust (Foucault, 1978) rather than them 
being co-creators of common goals. 
Mann (1986) contends that power clashes emerge in participatory 
processes as powerful actors restlessly pursue goals that increase their 
enjoyment of good life. Actors with social power are able to derive 
systematic benefits from the subordination of others using many methods 
such as coercion; and in the process inhibit the ability of other actors to 
develop and exercise their abilities, express their needs, thoughts and 
feelings (Tew, 2006; Young, 1990). However, Weber (1946) cautions that 
people’s ability to make others do things against their wishes can be 
challenged through subversive actions to express discontent. The use of 
coercive means thus does not guarantee public obedience to the system. 
Although denied access to their lifeworld resources and discursive spaces; 
actors subjected to oppressive power could become adept at resisting or 
subverting expectations of them from powerholders (Tew, 2006; Butler, 
1993 [1997]). According to Tew (2006), actors in coercive environment can 
find strategies to form networks to dialogue and cooperate in seeking ‘exit 
doors’ to survive outside the coercive environment.  
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It is argued that powerful actors often build structures that strengthen 
their control (Fairclough, 2001); limiting further freedoms of expression and 
assembly to actors that are lowers. This is against the Habermasian principle 
of openness in public proceedings (publizittit) to help actors utilise their 
shared capital to achieve common goals (Inglis, 2012; Habermas, et al., 
1974). Habermas, et al., (1974) contend that coercive tendencies in 
deliberative arenas can be so powerful that the influence of lowers becomes 
less and less. Njoh (2007) states that when ‘abilities’ of other actors to take 
action in a process are coerced, then their [p]ower does not exist as they 
cannot put it into action. Thus, the breakdown in participatory processes can 
lead to ideas being imposed on others by powerful individuals, groups and 
institutions. The lifeworld becomes colonised, and communicative actions 
which were meant to reach commonality tend to be used to dupe or bully 
other actors into submission (Inglis, 2012).  
3.4. Trust  
Trust is an important concept in environmental and public policy in 
general. According to Tsang, et al., (2009), trust’s prominent role is in 
facilitating collective actions and providing legitimacy (whether legitimacy 
means acceptance or support) to institutions, policies and actors’ roles in 
implementing collective actions. Much of the literature on participation, 
planning or deliberative processes consider trust (and its restoration) as a 
vital component to score higher on participatory/deliberative scorecard.   
Understanding trust can be drawn from psychological, historical, 
anthropological or other schools of thought; each approaching the concept 
with particular disciplinary lens and filters (Tsang, et al., 2009; Lewicki, 
2006). In this study, it is drawn from the social perspective, which 
emphasises on major roles trust plays in social processes (such as 
participation/cooperation) that are grounded on relations built through 
interaction (Tsang, et al., 2009; Gilson, 2003). The core meaning of social 
trust lies between people, people and organisations, and people and events 
or social processes. Tsang, et al., and Gilson further put it that citizen trust 
in government facilitates collective action that can improve outcomes from 
environmental decisions and can provide legitimacy to public institutions. 
Trust builds willingness in actors to cooperate towards a common goal even 
when not all their wishes have been met. However, the opposite can also 
happen. Decrease in [social] trust is typified by reduced faith and 
confidence in government institutions (Tsang, et al., 2009).  
Although trust is said to be riddled with paradoxes and complexity to 
build and maintain, it is argued that implementing an agenda (without trust) 
through use of coercive resources is considerably disadvantageous (Tsang, 
et al., 2009). Actors can rebut decisions that are distant from their lifeworld 
realities. Citing Kwong (2004), Tsang, et al., state that without trust in 
government and limited space to influence policy; people in China tend to 
seek ways of expressing themselves such as via newspaper columns and 
editorials. Scholars theorise that trust encourages compliance to laws and 
regulations and enhances democratic governance efficiency. Building trust 
in public institutions (and other actors) is thus vital for state action 
legitimacy and garnering public support (Gilson, 2003). Social exchanges 
and interrelationships formed by actors based on trust that others would 
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meet their obligations towards common goals reinforce collectivity. 
Embracing trustworthy behaviour and practicing trustworthiness either by 
accepting sharing decision-making power or providing deliberative spaces is 
required [even] amid distrust among others (Tsang, et al., 2009).  
It is however common for authorities to use coercion when citizens 
are noncompliant. Yet still, it is argued that paying attention to both trust 
and distrust is central in participation as they are expressive actions by 
citizens over deficits in the system or process (Tsang, et al., 2009). Distrust 
increases the cost of transactions by requiring more laws, monitoring or 
enforcement; and decreases government efficiency by rendering policy 
making and implementation more difficult  (Laurian, 2007).  
CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0.  Results 
The empirics in this chapter are divided in three sections (see figure 2 
below). The sections present actors’ problematisation of SWM in Lusaka, 
and in particularly Mtendere WMZ 11. The sections are accounts of 
households, the CBE in the zone and the LCC/WDC.  
Figure 1: Summary of actors’ problematisation of SWM. 
Source: Author’s compilation  
4.1. Observations 
I made observations by sitting with the CBE owner at the waste bin, 
moving around Mtendere WMZ and observing discussions on the LCC 
Facebook page. At the waste bin, all adults disposing waste were women. 
When it came to focus group discussions, women often spoke through men 
sited next to them. In one group, it was indicated that some husbands 
stopped their wives from talking to WDCs or CBEs because they “harass” 
them. Men in focus group discussions were however less knowledgeable 
about SWM issues. I also observed that some CBEs burn the waste at their 
waste bins although it is prohibited under the 2004 SWM by-law.  
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Figure 2: Pictures 1 and 2 – roadway waste dumping in Mtendere; Picture 3 – household waste 
burning at home; Picture 4 – Waste burnt at CBE primary disposal site. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork photograph compilation 
4.2. Households6
Payment duplication (through municipal taxes and polluter’s pay 
principle)
7
 is one of the ways households problematise SWM. One of the
households stated:“it is about where we are coming from, waste collection 
fees were part of municipal taxes. But when the new system was introduced, 
we do not know whether there was a downward adjustment to municipal 
taxes or not. If not, it means we are paying twice for waste.” Imposing 
things on people is another issue. “We have a history of this figure 
(individual or public institution) telling us what to do.” Some households do 
not know where ward planning (WDCs should facilitate) take place. “We do 
not know where they meet, maybe at the ward councillor’s home.” 
Households’ enthusiasm to participate is low for fear of being labelled anti-
government and victimisation over dissent views on public institutions. 
There is a tendency of mixing ruling political party issues and public 
institutions. Thus, divergent views over public institutions’ actions (or 
intended actions) are often seen as discrediting government.   
Grassroots spheres seem dominated and used for political activities by 
political systems. Actors who do not support the ruling political party are 
often excluded and sometimes victimised (verbally or physically). An 
example was given of a Mtendere resident who was murdered and his 
property destroyed by political supporters from the ruling party in 2015 for 
being “anti-government.” Threats and arrests related to SWM are also 
typical in Mtendere. WDCs focus on arresting households for non-
subscription to SWM systems. The Fast Tract Court was established to 
prosecute “defaulters.” Arrests have created tension among households who 
report others over SWM. Those who report others are considered bad and 
experience exclusion from community support systems such as informal 
lending circles households use to provide financing to each other.  
6
Some households were not willing to be recorded or photographed for fear of being 
identified and victimised. Thus, no house numbers, pictures or names  are included herein. 
However, coding numbers are used to trace views of interviewees in the appendix. 
7
 From the late 19980s to 2004, waste fees were embedded in municipal taxes . 
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CBEs, WDCs and LCC tend to use “inappropriate” words towards 
households. Some CBEs are “disrespectful” and harass women for non-
payment of waste collection fees. Door-to-door “enforcement” visits by 
WDCs, CBEs and LCC accompanied by police are viewed“intimidating.” 
Further, feelings of being disqualified and their ideas not appreciated typify 
households’ narratives. They said they were “not some of us8” to be 
involved in planning processes. “There is this question about who is 
talking? Is it a woman, youth, political supporter of which political party 
(opposition or ruling party) or someone with a high social economic status 
in society? This silences us.” Some households use the media to speak out. 
Mistrust in CBEs and their workers is the other problem. CBEs burn 
waste at the bin instead of having it disposed at landfills. CBE workers were 
accused of disposing waste within WMZs. CBEs’ capacity to adequately 
manage waste was doubted due to limited human resource and transport as 
they use wheelbarrows for waste collection. Poverty and lack of budgeting 
for waste emerged as another problem. Some households struggle with 
meeting basic needs and paying for waste due to poverty. However, some 
households felt that “budgeting for waste is not a priority to some people.”  
 
4.3.  Community Based Enterprise9 
Some households’ actions are out of chikonko10 (proving a point) that 
they are not happy with something. “I do not know really what causes 
illegal waste dumping. It is either people are not happy or they are doing it 
deliberately.” Some households subscribe to CBEs outside their zones if 
unhappy with the CBE in their zone. According to the CBE households’ 
mindset and lack of knowledge on good practices of SWM contribute to the 
problem. For example, some households question why they cannot dig 
waste pits. The CBE also views the older generation to have gotten used to 
‘free things’ when SWM was financed through corporate tax in the 1970s. 
“There are so many old people living on social welfare support here, so 
when it comes to paying for waste, it is difficult to them.” The CBE sees 
subsidy from high income waste management districts as key in bridging 
financial deficits in peri-urban areas. But stated that “we as CBEs do not 
know what happens to the subsidy coming from those districts.”  
The CBE felt that landlords have not been helpful in collecting waste 
fees through rentals. CBES thus lose reliable SWM financing as approaching 
tenants to pay and have their waste collected proved problematic. Asking 
landlords to add waste fees to rentals has been unsuccessful. “I have tried to 
request landlords to help me add waste fees to rent. Sometimes I have shared 
with them how I do it with my tenants. But people do not want to be told like 
children.” CBEs further face the problem of acceptance by households. 
They feel they are political supporters rewarded for their work to politicians 
to start waste collection businesses. “People called us CBEs thieves. We had 
                                                          
8
 “Some of us” can be the educated,  socio-economically wellup or politically connected. 
9
 CBE and CBEs is used interchangeably because the CBE owner I interviewed was also 
the secretary for the CBEs Association. He thus spoke in general and specific to his CBE.  
10
 The term chikonko is derived from Nyanja [one of Zambian languages]. It means 
harbouring something negative. The CBE interpreted its use to keeping something to for 
some time and at some point letting it out.  
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to engage WDCs and LCC; and we went to talk to them door-to-door. But 
people are still not paying despite taking such steps.”   
The CBE owner did not trust some workers and some households. 
Households sometimes add non-paying neighbours’ waste to theirs. Others 
do not pay to CBEs, but make arrangements with [CBE] workers to collect 
the waste for “small amounts.” The CBE indicated that “there are times I 
find the waste bin full, yet there is no money. My clients also come to 
complain that waste was not collected from them for days. I lose some 
clients due to dishonest actions.” In addition, some households dump the 
waste late in the night. The CBE conducts night-watch over the waste bin or 
do street patrols to avoid people dumping waste in the zone. The CBE also 
views political interference to be compounding problems in SWM such as 
the ruling party wanting its supporters to run CBEs. “With political interest 
in community businesses like CBEs, people are made to think it is true we 
are political party supporters.” 
 
4.4. Lusaka City Council/Ward Development Committee 
The LCC views CBEs’ failures as serious problems to SWM. The 
LCC stated that CBEs fail to monitoring compliance to SWM systems in 
zones; do not create awareness on SWM among households; and do not 
meet everyday SWM obligations such as consistently paying for secondary 
waste collection and paying workers. “Private collectors (franchises and 
CBEs) are not helping; they come back to us for help to manage the waste. 
Sometimes they do not pay workers or they fail to collect the waste.” The 
LCC added that households’ mindset and polluter’s pay principle pitfalls 
(non-reliability of payment system) exacerbated SWM problems. The LCC 
contended that “going to people’s homes to tell them to pay for the waste 
for it to be collected is inconveniencing and people are not accepting it. The 
polluter’s pay principle was put into effect without a reliable way of 
collecting waste fees due to political interest to ‘reduce’ municipal taxest, in 
the process ‘sweeping under the bridge’ expert views.”   
The LCC also felt that “people like free things. We introduced the fast 
track court to prosecute defaulters to make them comply.” Prosecutions are 
used as “warning to others that the law will visit them” if they do not 
comply. In addition, grassroots structures such as WDCs and zone 
assemblies were seen as political arenas by the LCC. Thus, the purpose of 
grassroots structures has been diluted with political interests. One cited 
example was the shifting of WDCs activities to ward councillors. The 
political leadership (ward councillors/MPs) “do not trust us, when we give 
advice on certain things; they think we are working against them and 
making them unpopular to voters.” There were instances when LCC staff 
got transferred to rural councils for giving an opinion on something the 
ward councillor or MP intended to do in their area. In addition, bad relations 
between households and CBEs create tension between them. Households 
complain to WDCs about some disrespectful (in words/actions) CBEs or 
refuse to subscribe to CBEs they were in bad relations with. In such cases, 
CBEs were spoken to and if the problem persisted; the WDC obtained 
petitions from households to have that particular CBE’s contract terminated.  
Other sources of bad relations are persistent reminders to households 
to pay for waste collection and reporting them to the LCC/WDC for non-
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subscription to SWM systems. The tension in relations has also been 
compounded by dishonest actions of some CBEs or households. Some 
CBEs do not properly monitor their workers, which results into non-
collection of waste from households who pay for the service. Similarly, 
some households are not reliable in their role in SWM. “We have cases 
where households are brought to us for burning waste and they claim they 
do not know it is prohibited. But when we check the list for people who used 
to pay and stopped; they are on that list.”  
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0. Analysis and discussion  
This chapter is divided into three main sections and sub-sections. The 
first section discusses participatory practices in SWM and situated them 
within Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation. The second section 
discusses mis/trust issues in the spheres. The third looks at power dynamics. 
The discussion is guided by research aims/questions that explored: how and 
to what extent actors participate; how actors problematise SWM; and sought 
links between resistance to SWM systems and exclusion from participation. 
5.1. Public spheres: forbidden spaces?  
People spirited participation that seeks to take power to the grassroots 
is one of the anticipated goals of the NDP (MLGH , 2013). However, from 
this study’s findings, some households do not know where actors meet for 
grassroots planning. Other narratives show a shift from the NDP principles 
on strengthened grassroots participatory processes in decision-making to 
exclusion, threats and arrests over noncompliance to SWM systems. The 
LCC stated that the Fast Track Court which was created to speed-up waste 
management related prosecutions was not part of the NDP but a means to 
seek compliance. Gramsci (1971) contends that repression by the authority 
never secures a stable social order that works for the authority’s interest. 
Actors outside power structures [Frasian subaltern counterpublics] can 
emerge to oppose authorities when denied access to spheres to voice issues. 
By subaltern counterpublics, Fraser (1992) referred to parallel discursive 
arenas for subordinated actors who create and circulate counterdiscourses 
that form oppositional interpretative actions, identities, interests, and needs. 
Identities as not “some of us” emerged from households who view 
themselves disqualified from public spheres due to their socio-economic, 
gender or political status. Households also felt their ideas were not 
appreciated in SWM.   
Grassroots spheres for planning and decision-making in SWM were 
dominated by the WDC and political leadership. According to the WDC, 
planning was done by WDC executive and the ward councillor. “We plan 
for the people and inform them afterwards about decisions.” This is 
contrary to WDC guidelines that provide for sub-planning units in each zone 
known as first level of participation for ordinary citizens (MLGH , 2013). 
The tendency to “plan for people” was described as “imposing things on 
others” by households. They were unhappy with the approach of planning 
for them. It is argued that people’s dissatisfaction in public sphere’s 
normative promises like being inclusive or deliberative tends to lead to 
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public resistance of the decisions (see Habermas, et al., (1974)). Colonised 
public spheres lead to external [keeping actors away from the spheres] and 
internal [preferring technical-scientific reasoning] exclusion (Arts, et al., 
2012) of community voices that have limited inclusion opportunities in 
institutionalised public spheres (Maia, 2007). 
Providing deliberative spaces and inclusivity of actors (like 
households and CBEs) and their views in decision-making is vital SWM in 
Mtendere for a number of reasons. Firstly, because decisions made on SWM 
affect [for example] CBEs who carryout primary waste collection. 
Secondly, the polluter’s pay principle places SWM financing on households. 
Thirdly, households and CBEs are required to sort and dispose the waste in 
primary waste facilities. In my view, without inclusivity and collective 
constructivity (sharing and learning) of SWM policies; chances of resisting 
imposed SWM systems  are high. Issues to do with developing more reliable 
payment systems might be reflected upon by different actors in deliberative 
and inclusive spheres. Sirianni (2009) argues that through deliberative 
actions; people are more likely to appreciate varied perspectives and hard 
trade-offs, thereby increasing acceptability of decisions made even when 
some actors’ preferences were not fully met.  
5.2. “Who is talking?”  
Actors are mainly excluded from participatory processes based on 
their socio-economic, political affiliation, age and gender. These exclusions 
silence households (creating discursive closures –Deetz 1992). Silencing 
households through socio-economic, gender selectivity or intimidation 
suppress them and their views. Households with divergent views were often 
considered anti-government and victimised physically or verbally. 
Households thus tend to keep ideas to themselves for fear of their utterances 
being construed to rebellion rather than voices seeking attention over poor 
SWM. Alvesson and Deetz (2000) contend that discursive closures hinder 
genuine dialogue by privileging particular actors or views over others. 
Households stated that they were often disqualified from PP based on the 
question of who is talking. “Is it a woman, youth, political supporter (from 
opposition or ruling party) or a person with high socio-economic status?” 
Some households are thus discouraged to participate or bring forward issues 
on SWM in their zones. Some CBEs are similarly often excluded from 
grassroots spheres in preference to [what CBEs view as] people with 
political connections in wards. The CBEs thus formed an association to look 
at issues affecting them in SWM.   
The socio-economically and politically powerful, are seen as movers 
and shakers of things in WMDs. Exclusion from processes that should be 
participatory make households feel they have little influence over issues and 
their ideas not appreciated. It seems political interests in grassroots spheres 
are due to high numbers of voters residing in peri-urban areas than high-
income areas. Grassroots structures meant for PP are thus used to penetrate 
communities by the political system. It is argued that actors with power in 
public spheres tend to have control over crucial domains of governance 
(Koch, 2013) in the process excluding others.  
On the part of the LCC, participation in SWM public spheres at 
grassroots and above has been weakened and dominated by political stakes. 
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The polluter’s pay principle was cited by the LCC as one politically 
influenced system; hurriedly effected before devising reliable modalities for 
household payment for waste and financing SWM infrastructure in each 
WMD, among other requirements. The LCC noted that people appreciate a 
convenient system. But with the pulluter’s pay principle, CBEs have to go 
to people’s homes asking them to pay before collecting their waste. 
Ubayasiri, (2006) contends that there are times when some actors are 
reduced to spectators while particular opinions replace ‘true’ public opinion 
in the public sphere.  
5.3. Communication practices  
Freedoms of assembly, speech as equals and access to information in 
the public sphere are some normative assumptions vital for shared 
communicative spaces (Carpentier, 2011; Mafuta, 2014). Communicative 
spaces allow people to think, talk, and act together with a commitment to 
make a difference towards the common good (see Habermas (1984)). It is 
however argued that building long term relations in the public spheres is 
difficult when communicative circumstances among actors deteriorate into 
back-talking, spreading of rumours and personal threats (Hart, 2003). 
Actors’ narratives in Mtendere WMD are characterised by rumours (such as 
CBEs are political party agents) and information gaps. But the LCC argues 
that responsible citizens have to take steps to find out which CBEs are 
servicing their areas. Households’ counter-views are that responsible 
citizens are usually in the minority when it comes to seeking information on 
acting responsibly (see LCC Facebook page (2015)). Households place the 
responsibility for strategic exploitation of communicative approaches on the 
LCC rather than people to look for information.  
The CBE interpreted some households’ resistant actions towards 
SWM systems as a communication of displeasure (chikonko). “What can I 
say about some of these people’s behaviour?It looks like chikonko. How can 
I explain a situation where people heap 4 to 7 waste bags by the roadside? 
It is not like someone was eating a banana while walking and throws the 
peel by the roadside.” The CBE added that some households “come here 
and dispose the waste without saying anything. When you ask for the receipt 
they will say we have money and we cannot keep the waste at home.” 
Depending on how the CBE treat households who take such actions; the 
situation could erupt into tension. For married women, the CBE indicated 
that husbands took offense on ‘harassing’ their wives over waste fees.  
Narratives and identity as not “some of us” emerged from households 
excluded from spheres where their voices should be heard. Given the 
theoretical perspective [of public sphere], this could be understood that the 
lack of collaboration created a vacuum; making households feel they have 
nowhere to go when they have problems. They argued that “if the LCC 
engages us, we can have a point of talking to them.” Households also felt 
that CBEs have no capacity to manage public meetings and have no 
mandate over public issues. “We have public institutions to talk to when 
things are not going well. We do not believe in CBEs taking our issues to 
government.” Shielding each other against litigation for non-subscription to 
SWM systems is the other narrative that emerged among households. They 
argued that they prefer protecting neighbours who help them when in need 
23 
 
than the LCC that cannot even do its public duties. Crossley & Robberts 
(2004) state that discourses of individuals reflect problems experienced in 
personal life histories in connection to wider social structures. Mtendere 
residents’ lived experiences could be a reflection of experiences in other 
peri-urban WMDs in the Lusaka. However, actors have reacted differently 
to their lived experiences as explained below. 
5.3.1. Acting on the message  
Actors have found ways of getting around emerging issues over 
waste management. Some dispose waste anyhow while others form 
associations (networks) to meet their needs and discuss matters affecting 
them. Other counteractions include colluding with CBEs’ workers to have 
the waste disposed. Could these actions be ‘invitational’ to authorities to 
relook at way things and involve actors in a better way? It is contended that 
[environmental] disobedience can be an act of seeking dialogue over a 
phenomenon so that it is understood and possibly resolved with target actors 
(von Essen, 2016; Markovits, 2005). The manner some actors dispose waste 
is done to make their feelings known as some households put it that 
“nobody wants to be surrounded by garbage, but it seems no one cares 
about hurdles we face.” Utterances of dissent in the media or by action 
could be used to initiate deliberations and finding ways of embracing varied 
views on how to address some deficits in SWM systems. 
Resistance towards policy or decisions can be an outcome of 
democratic deficits and a message to the authority about those decifits by 
other actors. According to Markovits (2005), policy/decision disobedience 
could denote democratic shortfalls and could provide opportunities for the 
correction of deficits threatening collective authorship of common goals in a 
situation. Actions by households to dispose garbage along roadways, at the 
market to avoid confrontations with WDCs and CBEs or subscribing to 
CBEs outside their WMZ could be expressions of displeasure towards 
SWM planning, policy-making or waste collection. The actions could be 
publicity about deficits in grassroots democratic spheres meant for “public 
spirited participation” where actors were supposed to meet and “ask each 
other and share views on what they hope for their wards” (LCC, 2008).  
5.3.2. Changing the narratives  
Respectful and regular communication among actors could help 
avert some misunderstandings and rumours on SWM. Existing grassroots 
structures might provide valuable communication where actors are 
discursively involved. Acting truthfully and timely on raised issues by 
actors could help improve trust or relations. According to households, they 
have been frustrated by lack of feedback on many issues by the LCC. 
During focus group discussions, a participant asked: “how rightly are we 
supposed to dispose waste? People are talking about WMDs, who is 
accountable or who do we see in case of a problem in SWM?” Such 
narratives maybe changed by taking responsive or proactive steps on issues 
directly taken to the LCC, through the media or by action. 
Narratives like name calling (“CBEs are thieves”) might also 
change through discursive processes as actors co-create SWM systems. In 
cases where something planned for did not work well, spaces for talking 
would be created. Actors could learn from each other’s experiences, seek 
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priority areas in each WMD and zone, know each others’ needs, 
perceptions, and other relevant aspects in seeking improved SWM. Actions 
or issues that hamper effective SWM could be discussed and disagreeing 
actors might reframe their views and listen to others. Households might feel 
things are no longer imposed on them and they might valuably come forth 
whenever issues that hinder SWM emerge in their WMDs or zones. 
Households for example, might become the ‘eyes’ of the LCC in ensuring 
things do not escalate into conflict but brought to the fore without delay. 
Narratives about the polluter’s pay principle being duplicate payment might 
be altered as actors gain understanding of the principle [how it came about 
or what it entails]. Creating understanding and making actors be part of the 
process might help in minimising tensions and improve on waste financing 
and management.  
5.4. Trade offs  
Households shield each other against waste management prosecutions 
to preserve socio-economic benefits derived from their social networks. 
With the enforcement of SWM by-laws by the LCC, reporting each to the 
WDCs for noncompliance to SWM systems is common. Reported 
households are often summoned to the Fast Track Court for prosecution. 
Thus, tensions and exclusions from social networks arise among households 
for reporting others over SWM. Social networks are sources of financial, 
social assistance and community bond in Mtendere. Households stated 
that“it is hard to survive here if you are not in good terms with others. We 
depend on each other during funerals, weddings or for financial support for 
business. We have financing cycles, where we lend each other money at no 
interest. But if you are not in good relations with others, you will be alone. 
That is why we say ‘do not insult a crocodile while legs are still in water.11”  
Bourdieu (1998) argues that networks are not only about loose 
associations for ‘playing games of amusement’ but are about institutions, 
relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s 
social interactions. The community networks underpin households; they are 
the ‘glue that holds people together.’ Hence households have opted to shield 
each other against arrests over SWM. The CBE was also discouraged to 
constantly remind households to pay for waste collection for fear of being 
called a “wizard” and lose out from social networks in the area. 
Mtendere households have situated resources that members negotiate 
to access through interaction with one another and members of other 
households (Hansen, 1997). Hansen’s observation (based on her two 
decades ethnographic studies in Mtendere) could explain the worries 
households expressed over tensions arising from reporting neighbours over 
non-subscription to SWM systems. Since households have financial and 
social networks for supporting each other, those reporting others over SWM 
related issues seem to disintegrate households’ networks. Households 
contended that associations or networks are valuable in their poor 
communities. The networks provide social, financial and moral support to 
members. As mentioned above, most of the households in low-income 
townships like Mtendere are in blue-collar-jobs and small scales businesses. 
                                                          
11
 The metaphor “do not insult the crocodile while legs are still in water” implies that 
someone should not insult or say bad things about people whose help they still need.  
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Low income and lack of collateral exclude them from access to finance 
(FinMart Trust, 2009). Informal money lending circles provided within 
households’ networks are thus highly valued sources of finance. Authorities 
could thus help in ensuring that networks are not disintegrated due to lack of 
actions on emerging tensions in the community. 
 
5.5. Degree of actors’ participation  
According to the LCC, ward councillors speak for households in their 
wards and represent them in decision-making processes. Ward councillors 
are part of WDCs which are decision-making committees at ward level. 
Actors also ‘participate’ by responding to public consultation 
advertisements in the media. Actors are further engaged on many issues 
using the Lusaka City Council Facebook page.
12
 Others call or visit the 
council to present their various issues. The council often writes to CBEs on 
issues like increases secondary collection fees or changes in SWM systems.  
Participatory scholarship situates PP at different levels. Arnstein’s 
(1969) participation ladder (as explained above) is used in this study to 
locate the level of PP in SWM grassroots spheres. Arnstein’s participation 
model is however used with recognition of its criticisms. For example, 
Painter (1992) criticised the assumption that decision-making occurs at a 
final point in the process as decisive events and contributions might come at 
any stage. However, the choice to use this model is because its conceptually 
sound in exploring actors’ level of involvement in participatory processes. 
On Arnstein’s participation ladder, participatory practices in SWM 
spheres could be situated within tokenism. Civic leaders “speaking” for 
households in decision-making, consultative meetings and public 
information packages channelled through the media are tokenistic practices. 
While opinions from other actors can be obtained via consultation, Arnstein 
regards it as a tokenistic exercise because it confers little real degree of 
power and control to non powerholders (Arnstein, 1969; Lane, 2005). 
Another view by Rioonwatch (2014) is that if involving the public ends at 
informing them of what is happening, or will happen in future by the 
authority, participation has not occurred. In addition, tokenism falls short of 
required level of participatory as information could be provided late when 
no changes could be made to the process, consultations done to endorse 
already made decisions (Raitio, 2012) and selecting two community 
members to represent others is only two voices among many others 
(Rioonwatch , 2014). For example, the ward councillor’s voice is just one 
voice in SWM, especially that councillors do not involve other actors to get 
a detailed picture of problematic issues in waste management.  
Based on my research findings, grassroots planning involves few 
actors under Ward Development Committees. CBEs’ associations hold their 
parallel meetings on issues that affect them in SWM. To be part of the WDC 
is by election or nomination by the community. However, in practice (at 
least in Mtendere), the WDC is composed of the ward councillor, ruling 
political party representatives such as chairpersons for the Ward, Section 
and Constituency and other party officials. Grassroots spheres seem to have 
been turned into political party spheres with less focus on community 
                                                          
12
 In March 2016, the Facebook page had 709 members who joined it. 
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participatory processes. Some households indicated that ruling parties have 
a tendency of picking people from grassroots party structures to make-up 
the WDC contrary to WDC guidelines of 2013 ( see MLGH 2013). 
Households who are key actors in SWM have been left out of participatory 
processes in preference to political actors. Thus, issues that affect 
households in SWM do not get the required attention or not attended to at 
all as political interests dominate the public spheres. In expressing their lack 
of spaces to engage the LCC; households stated that “if the LCC involved 
us, we would have somewhere to start from talking to them” rather than 
using tokenistic  practices (information,consulting or placating).  
5.6. Delinked  
WDCs are (supposed to be) the primary link between community 
members, ward development agencies (such as CBEs) and the LCC (MLGH 
, 2013). However, the LCC stated that ruling parties just allocate party 
members to constitute WDCs contrary to composition guidelines which 
provide for the inclusion of people from zones. WDCs are mainly seen to 
serve political interests instead of coordinating discussions on development 
needs and to provide feedback to the community on agreed issues during 
grassroots meetings (see MLGH 2013 for WDCs’ guidelines). This study’s 
findings generally show domination of WDCs by the ‘haves’  (elite and 
politicians) and non-institutionalisation of participatory principles. Thus, 
decolonising and depoliticising them might enhance inclusivity in discursive 
processes meant to improve SWM. Various actors could discuss and 
develop collective action plans on issues hindering effective SWM.  
It has been shown that when there is inclusivity, there is greater 
appreciation and understanding of issues by actors and possible ways of 
fine-tuning them in case of failure or for more improvements (see Crewe 
(2001)). Maia (2007) views public spheres as models of deliberative 
democracy where actors could justify their intended decisions and expose 
them to others’ perspectives and analysis to create democratic bonds actors 
view legitimate through interactive processes. Such interaction within the 
public sphere might create a balance between stability and social change, 
maintainable through the manner public affairs are conducted (McChesney, 
2007). SWM spheres could provide actors chance to talk, collect public 
views and assign responsibilities to some actors to ensure shared goals are 
achieved and feedback is provided to others.  
Arnstein (1969) contends that participation that does not redistribute 
power is a frustrating and empty process for the powerless. Households’ 
sentiments that things were imposed on them seem to discourage their 
contribution towards improving SWM. They opt to keep ideas to themselves 
or go to the media. It should be acknowledged that whereas actors in SWM 
expressed low zeal to participate in public spheres; there are cases in 
Zambia when a participatory process met actors’ desires. For example, the 
Energy Regulation Board in 2015 reconsidered hiking hydroelectricity tariff 
after public submissions against it during public sittings. One participant 
during the sittings stated: “we managed to get the domestic fixed charge 
maintained. It would have gone up 300%,” (Mwebantu Media, 2015). 
Actors’ lack of involvement enthusiasm in SWM participatory processes 
could be attributed to (inter alia) views that things were imposed on actors 
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or past experience in such processes or attaching views to the speaker’s 
socio-economic status. 
5.6.1. Practising what is on paper  
Good policy provisions about grassroots participation are contrary to 
practices on the ground in SWM. Firstly, devolution of power and 
facilitation of grassroots participatory processes through WDCs has been 
abandoned. WDCs instead facilitate arrests and prosecutions of households 
resisting SWM systems. Secondly, the LCC argued that there has been 
enough talking; contrary to decentralisation principles that provide for 
grassroots processes where people could be asked what they wanted done. 
Thirdly, the LCC use coercive means such as visiting households [with 
police] and making them pay for waste or face the law. Intimidating actions 
have contributed to making households feel things were imposed on them. 
But from focus group discussions experience, households can be engaged 
discursively when an atmosphere is cordial. For example, some household 
members who said they had nothing to do with SWM issues, contributed to 
the discussions even when they initially sat at a distance and preoccupied 
themselves with newspapers and cellphones. They could have gained trust 
in the discussion and became part of it. Creating a cordial environment 
where actors feel safe to meet and deliberate could provide an opportunity 
for co-creation of SWM systems actors might support. 
The LCC does not seem to have institutionalised participatory 
principles. In terms of short and long term plans, it is focusing on 
enforcement, re-introducing old system of paying for waste through 
municipal taxes, increasing workforce for more enforcements and 
prosecuting defaulting actors in SWM. Improving on grassroots 
participation does not seem priority. Upholding participatory principles 
from the top to grassroots might improve SWM in so many ways. It might 
help fill information gaps, create a sense of ownership, broaden 
understanding, and create awareness about environmental implications of 
poor SWM. Actors like households who currently feel their ideas are not 
appreciated and keep things to themselves might valuably come forth 
whenever there are issues that emerge impeding SWM in their zones.  
 
5.7. Dis/trust and rumours  
Trust is an important “glue or lubricant” (Raitio, 2013) required in 
participatory processes. SWM is one complex issue that requires actors’ 
collaboration because it involves various people in waste financing, 
collection, sorting, disposal and recycling. However, narratives on SWM in 
Mtendere are characterised by distrust. Rumour, lack of information and 
inadequate deliberative actions have worsened mistrust in actors’ relations. 
There are many facets of distrust narratives. On the part of households, their 
mistrust arise from past [dishonest] experiences in their interaction with 
CBEs, WDCs and LCC. CBEs workers some times dispose waste within 
WMZs or burned it at the primary disposal sites instead of having it 
disposed at the landfills. These actions seem to undermine households’ trust 
in CBEs. Households also trust issues with WDC and the council for failure 
to take action on issues raised with them (although some of them were 
unrelated to SWM). Households also engage in actions that risk trust in their 
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relations with other actors. For example, non-paying households for waste 
conspiring with CBE workers to collect their waste for small amounts.  
It is argued that mistrust, suspicions and rumours are not conducive in 
participatory processes. When suspicious and rumours are high, actors tend 
to be on guard against their stake rather than the common good (McMillan, 
2013). Sustained cooperation and active civic culture also diminish. Eroded 
confidence in SWM systems and grassroots participatory processes can be 
exemplified by households’ utterances that they would rather keep ideas to 
themselves for they feel unappreciated. Restoring trust is an important to 
score higher on participatory scorecard. The sustenance of trust could be 
enhanced through information sharing and deliberation in participatory 
spheres (Luarian, 2009). Luhmann (2005) links trust to participation through 
its growing relevance in complex issues and ability to mobilise particular 
public involvement to enhance the degree of participation. With trust in 
others, in the system and process; there is a possibility for actors in SWM to 
actively participate in collective actions. Deliberative approaches can foster 
collective learning on what is working or not, system limitations, emerging 
issues as other actors interact in WMDs; and possibly create more 
responsive and proactive actions plans towards SWM. 
Scholarly consensus on trust, mistrust and rumour contends that lack 
of information or taking it for granted that people know; strengthens 
speculations and could escalate mistrust. Rosnow (1988) argues that rumour 
is an explanation that reflects personal anxiety and general uncertainty in 
people when information to validate those improvised explanations is not 
provided. Unexplained issues tend to be speculated on to fill-in information 
gaps. People use rumour as public communication, infused with personal 
assumptions about how the world works (Rosnow, 1991). Amid mistrust in 
SWM participatory processes, rumour is used for sense making to help 
actors cope with uncertainty and worrisome things in their lives. For 
example, households supply ‘explanations’ on the introduction of the 
polluter’s pay principle as a duplication of payment to make money from 
them because they lack of information on how it came about. Deliberations 
in grassroots spheres could help minimise rumours.  
It is contended that when the public is involved early, their views 
obtained and reflected upon and possibly included in decision-making; 
chances of public trust in the system and support increases. For example, 
after analysing citizen participation in Boston Southwest Corridor project in 
the 1970s and 1980s, Crewe (2001) posited that the more designers valued 
citizens’ input, the more appropriate their designs became to users. 
Facilitators of participatory processes in the project obtained better ideas 
that made their final plans more accepted and much easier to carry-out. 
Similarly, in SWM, actors’ views could be obtained and unclear issues 
clarified. Mistrust could reduce actors’ seeming unwillingness to listen, 
reflect and understand the position of others. Investing in deliberative 
processes could thus enable actors meet in a non-coercive atmosphere to 
discuss, learn and provide preferred actions over the problem (Lukensmeyer 
& Torres, 2006). Actors could use grassroots spheres to share their 
concerns, fears and suggestions to improve SWM. 
Amid distrust, rumour and information gaps, the LCC argues that 
there has been enough of talking as it is time to enforce by-laws on SWM 
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and not talking stage. However, the ‘talking’ with actors has been mainly 
through the mainstream media (television, radio and newspapers), and 
online via the website and Facebook. Ward development committees that 
are supposed to be the link with grassroots do not involve actors 
deliberatively on SWM issues. The committees mainly focus on arresting 
and facilitating prosecuting noncompliant households. The talking stage was 
under the Sustainable Lusaka Programme, a donor driven programme that 
ended in 2004. The LCC views PP as a time-bound activity. But Reeds 
(2008) contends that participation is a process of learning and collective 
actions building on people’s needs. It requires ongoing involvement of 
actors to get a particular level of desired outcomes in decisions-making. The 
LCC needs constant participatory processes to ensure that emerging issues 
are timely included into SWM systems. 
Communication by the council mainly targets waste collectors (CBEs 
and franchises) and cooperating partners. To widen its communication, 
court convictions of SWM defaulters are used for information 
dissemination. The media is invited to cover them to warn others. However, 
households questioned the ‘excitement’ over SWM related convictions 
without making information on several SWM issues available in the public 
domain. Commenting on the LCC Facebook posting, a participant 
wondered: “but how can I be prosecuted when no waste company came to 
my home asking me to join the scheme? Where is the offence?” (LCC, 
2015). It is argued that actors’ dissatisfaction in PP can arise when 
communication is inefficiently done as it deprives less informed actors 
knowledge of the scope of issues to be deliberated on; thus distorting the 
public sphere as meeting space as equals (Thomas, 2005). Information 
inadequacy or distortions could create discontent in actors to be involved in 
matters of common importance. Inness (1998) puts it that understanding the 
real purpose of participatory processes in decision-making or planning lies 
in communicative actions. This entails that the manner information is 
exchanged creates meaning to the process and influence actors’ 
participation. Hanna (2000) views information as one of the biggest issues 
in participation, in terms of who controls it and whether it is trustworthy. 
5.7.1. Rebuilding trust 
Although participatory spheres in SWM are typified with multi-
actor interests and complexities; there are openings that could be used to 
reframe actors’ views and help in building relations towards a shared-
vision on SWM. Openings in involving others or talking could help create 
trust and improve on emerging conflicts in public spheres. Improved trust 
among actors could be sought by acting on causes of mistrust. Some issues 
raised included lack of action on matters presented to authorities, 
information void, dishonest and “imposing things” on others.  
Issues the council never acted on from households negatively 
affected their trust in it. One participant during focus group discussions 
stated that “I do not want to follow the LCC any longer. I have been going 
there for more than two years over surveying my land, but nothing has been 
done.” Such sentiments show displeasure and loss of confidence in the 
LCC. Loss of confidence in the council could erode actors’ willingness to 
collaborate with it over SWM unless steps that reframe actors’ perceptions 
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were taken. Most issues requiring action by the LCC were often in the 
media or posted on the institution Facebook page. In this study, I propose 
provision of information on SWM systems as one of the steps to reframe 
public perceptions. Households lack information on a number of issues to 
do with SWM and the LCC has not made information readily available.  
In terms of information gaps; firstly, it is unclear to most households 
how the polluter’s pay principle came about and what happened to waste 
fees imbedded in municipal tax. Secondly, how and why private waste 
collectors were introduced is mainly spectulated on among households. 
Thus, triggering rumours that CBEs came about as political payback to 
political supporters. Thirdly, households do not seem to know the role of 
WDCs as facilitators of grassroots participation. People often call, visit, 
email or post of the council Facebook page to know more about SWM. 
However, even when people take such steps, some responses by the council 
are discouraging. For example, on the council Facebook newsflash about an 
old woman convicted by the Fast Track Court over SWM, one person 
commented: “leave the old lady alone and put things in order. Are rubbish 
pits not allowed anymore?” The council responded that “your thoughts are 
so retrogressive and hypocritical. People complain of the city being dirty, 
but when we take action others are condemning. It does not make sense” 
(LCC, 2015). With such a tone, it could be hard for the person who asked to 
have trust in a discursive process with the LCC.  
CHAPTER SIX 
6.0.  Conclusion 
Based on actors narratives, although ‘participatory’ arenas for SWM 
exist; exclusion using socio-economic, political or gender selectivity typify 
PP in Mtendere. Grassroots spheres created for actors to “make known and 
discuss what they hope for” (LCC, 2008) in their lifeworld are dominated by 
the powerful (economically, politically or experts) contrary to discursive 
spaces that allow collective actions to improve a situation (Habermasian 
conceptualisation). Actors like the council have not utilised participatory 
opportunities to deliberate on issues they are at variance with other actors on 
how to approach them. They pull in different directions (for instance, 
experts versus politicians). Actors working in isolation seems 
counterproductive to SWM. For example, CBEs and WDCs formed  parallel 
structures for developing operational strategies and decision-making without 
involving households who are the most likely to be affected by those 
strategies and decisions. Amid lack of collaborative work, households 
formed counteractions [chikonko waste disposal] against the imposed SWM 
systems, thus making Mtendere filthily littered with waste. 
Politicisation of participatory spheres and mistrust have compounded 
the SWM problem. Grassroots structures for PP are fertile grounds for 
politicians to penetrate communities where majority voters reside. As a 
result, SWM and other problems households face are given little (or no) 
attention in pursuance of political interests. People who seem to discredit 
politicians in their utterances are often victimised. With mistrust among 
actors, further exclusion of ‘bad neighbours’ from networks takes place. 
Mtendere has networks that provide financial and social bufferzone to 
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households in hard times. The networks are based on trust and good 
relations. Mistrusted individuals are excluded from the networks. 
Households thus tend to side with social networks requirements than 
complying with SWM systems.  
Despite participatory processes in SWM being typified by varied 
interests and complexities; there are utilisable openings to help actors 
reframe their views and build relations towards a shared-vision. Perceptions 
and speculations that the polluter’s pay principle is a duplication of 
municipal taxes or CBEs are political party payback entities could be 
minimised when people are made part of decision-making processes. They 
would not lack information on many other SWM issues. Other openings the 
council could utilise are people’s actions or utterances in the media. It could 
use them to seek means of involving concerned actors in co-creating 
improved systems of managing waste. Trust could be built and sustained by 
acting on concerns raised by actors as soon as they emerge to avoid them 
escalating into tension. In the long run, people might use grassroots spheres 
to bring forward their concerns or fears in SWM rather than keeping ideas to 
themselves. 
 
6.1. Further research ideas  
Potential SWM research includes participatory research on how to 
deal with power aspects of the local processes or [re]building trust in 
decision-making. 
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Appendix 1: Conceptual design of grassroots participation 
Source: MLGH (2013) 
Appendix 2:  Interview guide –Waste Management Unit 
1. How is planning for SWM done?
Follow up questions
- Which actors are involved in the process?
- How do you involve them?
- Do you have actors you consider more important in this process?
- Speficically, how do you involve  households?
- What channels/platforms do you use to communicate/involve them?
- How do you get feedback from actors, for instance, in case there is a
dispute about something in SWM?
2. Where do you think the problem/s lies in SWM from the perspective of:
- Planning process
- CBEs
- households
- What is working and not working?
- How can things be improved?
3. How much waste is generated/day/month?
Follow up questions:
- How much is collected?
- Why the shortfall in collection?
4. From your experience in SWM, how would you describe trustworthiness
of:
- CBEs?
- Households?
- Politicians?
Follow up questions: 
- Why would you describe it that way?
- What do you think it causing the mistrust?
- How do you prefer things to be?
- How did you feel being treated that way?
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5. How are decision made on SWM?  
Follow up questions: 
- What influence do households have in decision-making?  
- Who do you consider movers of things in SWM? 
- How does influence by other actors affect your work in SWM? 
- Why do you think there is power clash in grassroots structures? 
- How best do think power of actors can be used to improve on SWM? 
 
6. Future 
- What are your future plans/hopes on waste management?  
- What are your concerns/fears? 
- How do you think your concerns/fears can be resolved? 
- What would have to happen to make this happen? 
- How differently can actors be involved in SWM? i.e. households, 
CBEs, central government, public agencies, etc? 
 
Appendix 3: Interview guide –Communications And Public Relations Unit  
 
1. How do you communicate with different actors on SWM? 
Follow up questions: 
- How do you obtain feedback from them? 
- Do you have any face-to-face discursive platforms with actors? 
- Do you have actors you consider more important in your 
communication strategy? 
- Which ones could those actors be? 
2. How are actors communicated to in case they go to media to raise an issue 
on SWM?  
Follow up questions: 
- How do you feel when actors go to the media to complain or 
highlighting problems in their area on SWM?  
- How do you provide feedback to actors who use the media to raise 
issues in general and SWM in particular? 
- How do you dialogue with actors in SWM in case of a dispute 
exhibited by actions or directly communicated to you? 
3. How do you communicate with households on good and bad practices of 
SWM? 
4. How do you communicate or collaborate with CBEs and WDCs to get the 
information to households on SWM?  
5. What are your concerns with communicative actions between the LCC and 
different actors? 
 
Appendix 4: Interview guide –Ward Development Committee 
 
1. What is your role in SWM in this area? 
2. How would you describe SWM in Mtendere WMD from the perspective 
of: 
- Planning process? 
- CBEs? 
- Households?  
- What problems impede effective SWM? 
- How can those problems be improved on? 
3. How do you facilitate the inclusion of various actors in grassroots 
planning, etc?  
Follow up questions:  
- Which actors do you often involve?  
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- Do you have preferred or actors you consider more important?  
- Specifically, how do households?  
- What platforms do you use to communicate/involve them?  
- How do you get feedback from actors on things not working well or 
any suggest over something on SWM? 
4. From your experience in SWM, how would you describe trustworthiness 
of: 
- CBEs? 
- Households? 
- Politicians? 
Follow up questions:  
- Why would you describe it that way?  
- What do you think it causing the mistrust? 
- How would prefer things to be?  
- How did you feel being treated that way? 
7. How are decision made on SWM?  
Follow up questions: 
- What influence do households have in decision-making?  
- Who do you consider movers of things in SWM? 
- How does influence by other actors affect your work in SWM? 
- Why do you think there is power clash in grassroots structures? 
- How best do think power of actors can be used to improve on SWM? 
- What are you concerns? Fears? Hopes concerning waste management? 
- How do you think your concerns/fears can be resolved? 
 
Appendix 5: Interview guide –households 
1. Do you have bins for throwing garbage in your area?  
2. What are you not happy with in SWM from the view of: 
- CBEs? 
- LCC? 
- Any other?  
3. Do you attend SWM planning meetings?  
Follow up questions: 
- If not, how do you know what you are required to do in SWM such as 
waste collection fees or change of SWM system? 
- If you do, are your views given satisfactory attention in decision-
making? 
- Are there other meetings you involved in? 
- How do you feel being treated that way? 
4. From your experience in SWM, how would you describe trustworthiness 
of: 
- LCC 
- CBEs? 
- Politicians? 
Follow up questions:  
- Why would you describe it that way?  
- What do you think it causing the mistrust? 
- How would prefer things to be?  
5. What are you concerns? Fears? Hopes?  
Follow up question: 
- How do you think your concerns/fears can be resolved? 
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Appendix 6: Interview guide –Community Based Enterprise 
1. What zone do you collect the waste from?
Follow up questions:
- What challenges do you face in SWM?
- How do you involve households when you facing a problem?
- In case the problem persists, do you involve WDCs or the LCC
directly?
- Why do you prefer doing it that way?
2. Do you attend SWM planning meetings organised by WDCs or the LCC?
Follow up questions:
- If not, how do you know what you are required to do in SWM such as
how much waste collection fees to charge or change of SWM system?
- If you do, are your views given satisfactory attention in decision-
making?
- Are there other meetings you involved into?
- If you are not involved in any SWM meetings, how do you raise issues
you feel are not working for you?
- How do you feel being treated that way?
3. From your experience in SWM, how would you describe trustworthiness
of:
- Households?
- LCC?
- WDCs?
- Politicians?
Follow up questions: 
- Why would you describe it that way?
- What do you think it causing the mistrust?
- How would prefer things to be?
4. What are you concerns? Fears? Hopes?
Follow up question:
- How do you think your concerns/fears can be resolved?
Appendix 7: summary of interviews with actors 
ACTORS CODING 
7.1. Households 
Participatory process 
We do not know where they mee, maybe at the ward councillor’s house. Can they call 
us? We are not some of us. We only get letters telling us that fees have been 
increased, this what has been agreed upon, payment for waste will be made to this 
person now onwards, etc. With such kind of communicating, someone can simply 
type and tell us we have increased waste fees. The letters are written on plain papers 
[not official headed paper] without a date stamp. We may have a lot of things in our 
heads, but we can’t say them out in fear of being considered wrong citizens instead of 
taking bad waste management as a wrong to people’s well being. We end up keeping 
things to ourselves and let things be as they are managed. We feel our voices are not 
appreciated 
We are coming from an imposing background where this figure [President or 
government institution] did things for us and told us what to do. Despite having 
moved from a one party state to democracy, we feel most of the people are not ready 
to participate in national issues without fear of being labelled anti-government. We 
 1. Exclusion/
mistrust
 
 
 2. Domination/
coercion
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cannot hold anyone accountable for failure to do their duties if waste is not collected. 
We run a risk of being accused of not subscribing to SWM for demanding better 
services, we fear being looked at as labels (labelling against the system). 
 
Basically, it is about where we are coming from; the waste collection fee was part of 
the land rates payable to the council. But when the collection fees were unbundled 
from the land and property rates, we were not informed. We are not sure whether 
there was an adjustment downwards from the property and land rates after 
introduction independent waste collection fees or it is still there; meaning we are 
paying twice for the waste. Nobody bothers to explain to us what is happening. The 
council is rigid; it has very rigid structures for public voices. 
 
Sometimes when we complain about things we are considered to be opposing 
government. It is not considered our right for clean environment. We cannot freely 
speak without being labelled ‘opposition political party members.’ Political 
supporters beat for saying bad things about government. Someone had his shop and 
stand at the market destroyed by politcal party supporters. They latter went for him 
and murdered him.  
 
There is this question about who is talking? If it is a woman, youth, political supporter 
from the opposition parties or someone with a high social economic status in society. 
If you are not part of them, your views mean nothing. We are silenced in most cases. 
Zambian society is influenced by patriarchal system which places much emphasis on 
men as heads of systems [home, institutions, government, etc]. Secondly, there is 
unwritten code of conduct which promotes respecting elders to an extent that even 
when they “step on your toes” you should politely tell them “please may I remove 
my toes under your foot” [i.e. when an elderly person does something which takes 
away a young person’s freedom to achieve their rights, the young person who not say 
it but try to smile about it.] 
 
CBEs also only come when collecting waste and fees. We do not sit down to discuss 
anything. We do not even know the approved fees because people pay differently 
between K20 and K30 since they charge us differently. We feel sidelined in the 
process of improving the way waste is being managed. Nobody listens to us. For 
example, we do not have enough bins in the area; as a result, people throw the waste 
down since bins cannot keep the waste generated in our yards. We end up burn it. 
Ward councillors do not provide platforms for discussing issues that affect us here. In 
my area, I have never heard a public discussion, I do not even know when public 
meetings are held [if at all they are held]. People end up going to the media to present 
their anger. Those who do not have the courage to go to the media, mind their 
business. If one has a kantemba [corner shop] they focus on it and see how to survive.  
 
Politics in grassroots spheres?  
Most voters are in compounds [low income areas], we are the play ground for 
politicians. We are not just majority voters, it is easy to buy off people with small 
things like beer, money or causal jobs since most people do not have income, they fall 
for anything. When you look here in Mtendere, how many voters are here compared 
to Kabulonga for example [Kabulonga is a high income area], we are more here, 
politicians prefer such places like Mtendere for political reasons. They would not 
mind about wards in high income areas. In high-income areas, people have small 
family sizes, like two children, but here most people have more than 6 children. We 
also keep a lot of our relatives. All these make compounds fertile grounds for 
politicians.These officials at ward and other zones are used to do political duties 
instead of their duties. For instance, the WDCs here are always at the ward 
councillor’s house, they more like his assistants. [2 times I contacted the WDCs 
executive for interviews he was at the ward councillor’s house and indicated he was 
sent to do something for ‘the boss’].  
 
People here can kill for their political parties. We have people who were sentenced to 
death over the murder of someone in Mtendere Extension. You could have read about 
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information gap 
 
 
 4. Freedom of 
speech/intimidati
on/power clashes  
 
 
5. Disqualifying /  
culture/power 
dynamics 
 
 
 6. Lack of 
communicative 
spaces/ 
alternative 
actions 
 
 
 
 
 7. Politicisation 
of spheres/ 
exclusion  
 
 
 
 
 8. Potilicisation/ 
violence/desired 
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it. The man refused to supporting ruling party activities, he was supporting the 
opposition party. They looted his shops and beat him to death. Such incidences tells 
you something about how much political interest in on areas with higher numbers of 
voters. We would love the same attention when it comes to our wellbeing, when it 
comes to things that affect our lives, we are most affected with a lot of things here 
(e.g. cholera, water shortages, power outages, drainages, floods, etc). 
We do not have a voice here, we are not at the same level with high income people. 
Maybe because we do not pay tax from our small businesses, nobody seems to care 
about our wellbeing. During elections yes we see them around, they give us tshirts, 
chitenge [wrappers], buy people chibuku [local brew], etc. But after elections that is 
the end, we only hear about them in newspapers and on tv. Even ward councillors are 
not seen. But they live with us here. How do we talk to them? Will they listen to us? 
Most of the times they just agree with what people say and once they leave, that is the 
end, nothing will happen, our problems will not get any attention  
What do you wish? 
We prefer the LCC engaging us. Currently, if we have a problem we cannot go 
anywhere if the LCC was involved with us. We could have a point of talking to them. 
Look at the markets, there are LCC offices who deal with every day issues of 
markets. People can walk there and present their issues. They can engage them and 
iron out things before they get worse. Now us, we are dealing with CBEs, at times 
they start quarrels with our wives telling them off on the road for non payment. They 
tell them “after all you do not even pay, what are you saying?” In our society we 
cannot allow CBE employees to be harassing our wives over waste. [interjection] on 
that point, we cannot be working with people who do not respect our women. With 
me if  I am not there, no CBE should start asking anyone to pay for waste. We have 
decided to be paying to a different CBE because others are not respectful. CBE need 
support from the LCC and government. Capital projects for buying reliable transport 
requires a lot money. CBEs cannot manage such projects. Even the LCC does not 
have adequate transport for secondary collectio, government has to support the LCC 
on transport 
Waste collection 
The bins are not enough. The population in Mtendere is too high. People end up being 
limited to 25kg of waste per week and the excess they either burn it or burry it to 
avoid paying extra cost or prosecution [in case of indiscriminate dumping] of the 
excess waste. “We keep the waste if it is more than 25kg limit per month at our 
homes and burry it or burn depending on the type of waste. We cannot risk being 
arrested and prosecuted or charged extra fee for generating more waste than the 
recommended in a particular timeframe.” 
The K30/month collection fee is too much. “We would prefer to burn the waste and 
use that money to buy food for the family. Cholera can break out, but we have little 
option. Meeting our livelihood is more important compared to paying for waste 
collection.” CBEs only come when collecting waste and fees “we do not sit down to 
discuss anything. We do not even know the approved fees because people pay 
differently between K20 and K30.  
Some houeholds dispose the waste at the market to avoid paying extra for excess 
waste. At market, market committees manage the waste at the market by collecting 
collection fees from all those selling at the markets. It is bad to have garbage around. 
We all want to throw it away. But the way things are happening is discouraging for 
anyone to suggest anything.We have a lot of ideas.  
Trust 
Households have trust issues with the LCC mostly due to their past experience with it. 
It was noted in one FGD: “when you talk about LCC; my perception or trust in them 
[laughs, shaking head] is a bad one. I have taken papers for my land and it has taken 
almost two years, they have not done anything. I am sited here, they will come when 
actions 
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they want.”  In terms of providing services for the community, household described 
the LCC to be “never been there, we have not confidence in them.” CBEs are not 
trusted as they collect the waste and dispose it within the area; mostly because they 
hire ‘freelance collectors’ who are in a hurry to finish the work and go do other 
things. In addition, households indicated that “CBEs clean drainages and leave the 
waste for days due to lack of transport to take it to waste bins. As a result, the waste 
gets back into the drainage as vehicles push them back. The CBEs end up doing same 
things every day instead of collecting waste from other areas.” 
 
Other trust issues emerged within households themselves. With the introduction of 
the Fast Track Court by the LCC, some households report others for illegal dumping 
of waste and they get summoned or warned by the WDCs.  This has created mistrust 
among households. As a result, some have lost their networks. Lose of networks have 
social and economic implications on households since they depend on each other for a 
number of community activities such as: 1. Financial support: households run 
lending circles to finance ‘capital projects’ since borrowing from banks without 
collateral exclude them from formal lending systems. The informal lending circles in 
the area involve a group of different households who give money to one individual in 
a month [e.g. US$50 by 10 members]. Such money is used as initial capital to 
purchase merchandise to sell at the market or any other micro scale business such as 
selling dry fish, vegetables, second hand clothes, etc. Households who report others 
for illegal waste dumping are excluded from the lending circles. 2. Social support: 
households have moral and financial support among themselves in times of problems 
such as funeral or when there is a wedding in one the households. Those who are not 
trusted are sidelined and do not get help from others. Reporting neighbours for illegal 
waste dumping is one source of such divisions. The households stated: 
 
“[...] without good relations with neighbours here, it is difficult to survive. We depend 
on each other so much. Provoking neighbours means no one will help during 
problems. In times funerals or weddings, we contribute in whatever way for it. In fact, 
we are better off protecting our neighbours from the council. They stand by us every 
day. That is why we say ‘do not insult a crocodile while legs are still in water .’ [The 
metaphor “do not insult the crocodile while legs are still in water” implies that 
someone should not insult or say bad things about people whose help they still need]. 
3. Social, religious and market clubs: there are associations and clubs co-managed in 
these societies such as Mtendere Churches Response Alliance (MCRA). 
 
CBEs’ Capacity 
Using wheelbarrows is not an efficiency way to collect waste from Waste 
Management Districts [WMDs] with high numbers of households like Mtendere 
WMD. Zone 11 in Mtendere WMD for instance has more than 1800 households 
whose generated waste cannot be adequately collected using wheelbarrows. For CBEs 
using wheelbarrows to collect waste from all these households per week or month is 
not achievable. Increasing the numbers of CBEs and waste bins would help improve 
waste management in WMDs. As a result, it forces CBEs waste collectors to throw 
the waste along roadways, waterways or undeveloped pieces of land/structures. They 
do not have the capacity to do a good job in meeting waste collecting requirements in 
relation to waste generated by households. CBEs clean drainages and leave the waste 
for days due to lack of transport to take it to waste bins. As a result, the waste gets 
back into the drainage as vehicles push them back. The CBEs end up doing same 
things every day instead of collecting waste from other areas. Some CBEs organise 
freelance wheelbarrow owners to collect the waste and CBEs pay them for the waste 
collected. However, these freelancers are too busy to do a good job; they often throw 
the waste anyhow instead of taking it to the waste bins located in different locations. 
Very few people feel a citizenry responsibility to manage the waste. The current 
system is not a sustainable way of managing waste. We do not know why LCC 
cannot collect the waste as it used to be done previously. No one explained to us why 
there was a change of the waste management system. There is no information on good 
and bad SWM practices for us to work with as we participate in waste management. 
We are not communicated or educated on what is happening on SWM 
 
 
 
 
 15. Trade offs: 
network 
exclusion vs 
SWM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.  Narrative on 
value of social 
networks 
 
 
 
 17. Trust/ CBE 
capacity/ 
information gaps/ 
unawareness  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
Suggestions, fears, hopes? 
Integrated SWM where all stakeholders be involved, the issue is not for the LCC, it 
involves all of us, limiting SWM to LCC as the preserve of knowledge on what works 
for the people excludes people outside the SWM process. Can waste be transferred 
into cash, so that it becomes attracted or how best can we put it to make people see 
value in it, see it a resource? Then how are we dividing the area for managing waste? 
Some waste management zones are too big for CBEs. CBEs are not cost effective, 
they gamble by saying CBEs should manage waste without infrastructure and 
equipment like transport trucks, wheelbarrows are not viable for collecting waste. 
How many workers do CBEs need to collect waste from more than 500 homes using 
wheelbarrows per week?  
 
Innovation  
When you talk about CBEs, do they see value in the waste or it’s waste as waste? The 
CBEs do not look at waste as a source of money, otherwise they would have created 
links with recycling companies and make money from it and dispose at the primary 
what ca not be recycled by the companies they have agreements with. There is need 
for mindset change and there is need to see waste as a means to earn money and input 
into the production system. People [CBEs, LCC/WDCs] involved in SWM should be 
proud of their role in environmental protection through stimulating and supporting 
good SWM practices. What is there for people? How do you make them see value in 
waste? LCC/WDCs can look at holding meetings on improving waste management –
looking at best and bad waste management practices, issues affecting effective waste 
management, what are locals not happy with, where do they feel they are excluded 
and act out of defiance to signal their displeasure to the authority. What are the 
perceptions towards waste collectors in communities? Mostly waste collectors are 
looked down upon and their work is ridiculed. This erodes their pride to be doing 
something towards protecting the environment. It seems there are no guidelines to 
protect waste collectors against diseases by ensuring they have protective clothing 
and proper tools for collecting the waste. The current status [using wheelbarrows, not 
protective clothes, bad public perceptions, etc.] is discouraging people to work in 
waste management.   
 
We have to learn to use politics for the good of people. Whether politics is used in 
these planning structures for the LCC, it should work for the good of us. Politics 
should not derail things, not all activities with political connotations are bad. We 
should use politics to improve the welfare of communities.  
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7.2. Community Based Enterprises –CBES  
People dumping waste illegally are there, it’s not clear why...we made a follow up 
with LCC in sensitising households [landlords] about good and bad SWM practices. 
Illegal dumpers we have tried, but there is a problem, they come at night [e.g. mid 
night] because before mid-night as CBEs we patrol to monitor who is throwing waste 
anyhow.  
 
We told households that landlords should include waste collection fee on rental 
charges since most of the tenants don’t pay if it is left for them to pay. We proposed 
that the same way landlords include in water and electricity bills, the waste collection 
fee should be added to the cost of renting the house. The tenant-landlord agreement 
should include waste collection to ease the process of collecting SWM collection fees. 
It reduces chances on non-payment. 
 
Some landlords comply and pay for their tenants then the CBE go to the houses the 
landlord paid for to collect when we go to collect we only collect from those who 
have paid. Some of the people are just used not paying, some pay others do not pay 
within the set of flats so when we go to collect, and we expect every household to 
dispose a 25kg per week. If we find more we will not collect the excess because at 
times you find others are paying while others are not paying. If you find more, the 
other waste you do not collect. We cannot force them, last time we tried to involved 
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the police, but it creates conflict with our neighbours, they feel we are bad people, 
they do not look at us as service providers of SWM 
 
In the dry season most people burn the waste, we collect less waste even the bins are 
often not full. Illegal dumpers we have tried, but there is a problem, they come at 
night [e.g. mid night] because before mid-night as CBEs we patrol to monitor who is 
throwing waste anyhow. When we started, people were apprehensive, they did not 
trust us, they thought were stealing money from them since they were not used to 
paying for the waste and LCC did not communicate adequately on the new system 
 
People are now understanding, sometimes I catch illegal dumpers [those disposing 
waste in undesignated places] and I talk to them more like educating them on existing 
SWM systems. If they are arrogant I take them to the police and the following day we 
arrange to take them to LCC at the Fast Track Court where they are prosecuted. But 
you know we are neighbours taking them to the Fast Track Court make our 
neighbours look at us with red eyes [as bad people] or they can call you a wizard, who 
does not have their welfare at heart especially where the person sent to prison catches 
a disease due to bad conditions in prison. We end up taking them to the police where 
they pay a fee for detention to the police. They pay K22.5 as commitment of the 
wrong. They are then forced to pay the additional K20 [for disposing the waste in the 
bins or K30 for us to collection from their homes] before they are released from the 
police cell. 
 
Like me who runs a taxi business as well, bad relations with households can cost me 
my taxi business. People cannot be booking my taxi. That is why I stopped following 
people in their homes asking them to pay for waste. If things get worse, I will stop 
running the CBE and concentrate on by small business (grocery shop and taxi).  
 
Why do you think households do not pay? 
There are many causes. Some people are not honest. Sometimes you will find myself I 
am paying and my neighbour does not pay. But I will come and use the garbage bag 
of that person paying to add my waste so that it is diposed off. We told them when 
going round [CBE association], I gave them the example of myself where I gave all 
my tenants a form of agreement where garbage, water & electricity is there. So I do 
not wait for them to pay for rent first, they pay for everything together. There is no 
way someone will tell me this month I am not paying for waste because I am moving 
out or do not have money, it is part of the rentals.  
 
As CBE association we have been telling people some have listened. We do not have 
problems with some households. You find at the month end they come and tell you “I 
am paying for my houses; how many people, maybe 4 for myself and my tenants”and 
it remains on us to go and collect from those houses. But you find some houses others 
you find 2 are paying others are not. We only collect from those who pay because we 
have a ‘requirement’ every household should dispose 25kg every week and when you 
go at a house you are supposed to collect two 25kgs and if you find more, the rest you 
wo not collect. 
 
Some of them are sincere they will tell you some of these bags it is those who brought 
them waste bags and when you go to them they will tell you ”first my husband comes 
I talk to him about it” The thing is you cannot force them because last time we went 
round with the police [silence]; some people are complicated. Some dig and bury 
some are too poor, even when you look at the person you will see poverty the moment 
you arrive at home then you just leave because they will tell you here I have not paid 
for water and electricity. After talking to those who dig pits, they will say we have 
stopped. People burn the waste mostly during the dry season. But during the rainy 
season, the waste bin gets full within two days. We usually more clients during the 
rainy season. Illegal dumpers we have tried. But you find they come at night, 
sometimes the bin empty during the day, but by morning it will be full. They dispose 
at mid-night sometimes. So when I knock off late from my taxi business maybe 
around 23 I watch over the bin since it is near home or do patrols in the zone.  
 
 
4. Trust/ opinion 
on 
communication  
 
 
5.Communicativ
e actions/ fear of  
public 
perceptions/ 
litigation 
 
 
6. Fear of losing 
from networks/ 
community 
benefits 
 
7. Mistrust 
 
 
 
8. 
Communicative 
actions  
 
 
 
 
9. Poverty vs 
SWM/ night 
patrols / 
discursive 
actions  
 
47 
 
 
 
Waste along roadways? People have a tendency of throwing waste at night 
.sometimes just here you can be sited watching someone will come walking and drops 
are plastic of garbage without bending. Others dump several bags as if they agreed. 
Sometimes 4 to 7 bags lied along the road. It is not like someone walking while eating 
a banana and throws the peel, this is deliberate, chikonko maybe. It is not easy to 
pinpoint at the actual cause of their behaviour. 
 
Communication when you change waste collection fees? We write them letters and 
give them give them a month or two months because when we change it is across all 
CBEs depending on their area of collection [conventional or nonconventional]. But in 
this area of mine I have [conforming from the book] I have 1804 households, but less 
than a quarter of that number pay. To me, 456 pay the rest do not pay; others stopped 
after paying for few months. Ok we have tried but to talk to these people; "you people, 
what can we do for you to improve SWM?” But you know, people are difficult. When 
we (as CBEs) tell LCC people are not paying, they tell us it is business try your 
business to get them paying. Last time I was suggesting to LCC that since people in 
Mtendere pay for ground and property rates why cannot 10% come back to use we 
improve on the shortfall in waste management but you know they are busy preparing 
themselves doing political errands. There are times trucks for collect waste are taken 
somewhere even if they find it collecting waste here they will tell the driver to stop 
and take the truck to an area of political interest. 
 
Running a CBE is very involving the LCC gave new ones 1 contract instead of 3 to 
see if they are strong you always need to be on the ground ensuring the waste is 
collected. There are times my workers do not collect from my clients, they are paid 
small [like K10] amounts by households who do not pay to me. You find the waste 
bin is full but there is no money, the workers find their own hidden clients and you 
find my actual clients come to complain that you have not collected my waste. 
 
 
Power? 
We are allowed to set waste collection fees but the LCC approves them. But since the 
LCC has a tendency of increasing secondary collection fees without discussing with 
us CBEs, we also increase whenever the cost of managing the waste goes up. There is 
too much politics “I cannot say much” [silence] there is a problem with political 
influence in running things. There is nothing much we can do. For example in 
Mtendere they wanted political supporters, their cadres to run the CBEs when the new 
govt when they came into power in 2011. They thought CBEs were companies for the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy [the former ruling party]. We told them no, no! 
We are from different political parties serving the people, so they even wanted to 
terminate our contracts. Some of the CBEs had the contracts in fact like one at 
Mahatma Gandhi [Mahatma Gandhi WMZ is one of the zones in Mtendere ward] 
 
Attitudes? 
Some people are stubborn they do not want to pay and they dump the waste anywhere 
at times they come and dump at the bin without them paying. There is inconsistency 
in paying and people give all sorts of reasons at times out of 100 houses, only 15 
would pay in a month. We have stopped tell people to pay for waste people can 
bewitch you out of it. Some people think we are making a lot of money from SWM. 
Old people are willing to pay because of the old system when government provided 
SWM services for free they feel we are exploit them. They think up to now they 
should not pay for the waste. We explain to them that the trucks require fuel to 
remove the bins to the final disposal points. Some people are difficult, when you go 
there today they will tell you we have no money, we will pay when we have it. So do 
not pick our waste. That is why  myself I have stopped telling people to pay or 
following them in homes to tell them to pay.  
 
Some of them listen but at night they are the same culprits who come and throw here 
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and when you ask them why are you throwing here without paying? They will tell you 
I do not have money what can I do with the waste?  Sometimes you find them 
carrying  bags of waste going to dispose and when you ask them where they are going 
that late? They will tell you we did not know we are required to pay. But there are 
bins everywhere in the country no one should lie they do not know. We told them they 
should not be burning or burying because the land is for the LCC, they are just given 
to build their houses there, it is not their land that’s why it has a tenure system. People 
used to say “we are thieves” and they refused to pay since the LCC did not educate 
them about the new system of SWM 
15. Mistrust
7.3. Lusaka City Council –LCC 
Legal mandate 
The mandate of waste management for the LCC is under two Acts: Public Health Act 
and Local Government Act. The Acts mandate the council to collect residential and 
non residential waste. Residential waste collection fees are divided into low, medium 
and low cost. Conventional areas/ households subsidize nonconventional areas/peri-
urban areas to have enough financial capacity to collect the waste. The current 
status/level of collection is not bad. Collection levels fluctuates between 45-50% to 
above 50% depending on collection compliance and CBEs’ collection equipment 
availability and condition [good or bad road condition] 
Firstly, the system [where private collectors come into play] in place could be good if 
supported by the community i.e. people to do their part in terms taking the waste to 
designated collection points where bins are located and paying the collection fees 
consistently. Secondly, the current system operating under the “Polluters’ Pay 
Principle” (PPP) is not helpful as waste generators are not willing to pay for the waste 
they generate e.g. households want free things. They have a bad mindset towards 
paying for waste collection. The application of PPP entails that CBEs only collect 
waste from households that pay the collection fee. As a result, those whose waste is 
not collected illegal dump the waste anywhere they find space. Most the times, such 
spaces are waste ways (drainages). This blocks the drainages resulting into water 
borne diseases, and bleeding grounds for mosquitoes which cause malaria.  
Waste collection is divided into Waste Management Districts (WMDs) and further 
sub-divided into Waste Management Zones (WMZs) where private individuals sign 
contracts with the council to collect the waste. The private collectors are in two 
categories: Franchise and CBES. The franchises are large scale collectors from high 
residential areas [those with high income levels]. CBEs are local enterprises within 
each township who sign contracts with the council to collect the waste. CBEs have 
problems of equipment breakdown and non payment of collection fees by households 
thus forcing them to leave the waste generated by households who do not pay the 
collection fees.  
Participatory spaces 
People participate through civil leaders (councillors) who represent the people are 
municipality level. The councillors are heads of wards. Each ward has Ward 
Development Committees (WDC) which serves as a platform for discussing issues 
that affect locals within their ward area. The public relation office is the entry point 
for issues that affect people in various set ups. Community radio stations are used to 
create awareness and educating people on why they should pay for waste collection. 
LCC does not initiate things for dialogue/public participation to take place on a face 
to face basis. Using radio does not guarantee listenability of intended audiences. But 
face to face platforms guarantees feedback on how people feel about the way waste is 
being collected in the city). Phone calls and walking into LCC offices for any issues 
are some channels used. Door to door methods are also used to enforce payment of 
fees. Advertisements: notifications in forms of adverts are put in the public media and 
people give at least 2 weeks or more to respond either in written or verbal. “We allow 
people to give us feedback. But when people do not bring issues within that window, 
it’s difficult for us to be inclusive in our processes.” 
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SWM is a shared and multi-stakeholder engagement responsibility that LCC alone 
sustainably manage. It requires the involvement of everyone from child to elderly 
people. But the mindset is affecting the engagement of different stakeholders in waste 
management. It derails sustainable waste management in the country. The by-laws on 
SWM provide that 40% of the waste is managed by the LCC while 60% is shared 
between CBEs and the Franchises. But CBEs are facing problems in managing the 
waste mostly because people are not willing to pay for the waste. Their mindset is 
bad. They want the council to do it for them. As a result, the LCC has to come in and 
collect the unpaid for waste by the households to ensure the waste disposed in right 
places. The fact that the LCC does not have enough police officers to patrol 
townships to ensure no one dumps waste anyhow; people have taken it for granted 
and litter the city with waste anyhow. The K450 for defaulters is not enough 
hindrance to careless waste disposal ; meaning LCC have to do more than using 
enforcement to make people comply to SWM system.  
Waste and diseases increase, thus making the situation is very bad. We need people to 
support the course and promote good SWM practices. We also need education and 
enforcement: education to change mindset and enforcement to ensure there is 
discipline among citizens. The population has grown, but since 2003/04; there has 
been poor SWM leading to increased amounts of diseases caused by poor SWM. 
Education/awareness creation can change mindset and help people know/links 
between SW, diseases and the environment such as water table pollution and air and 
other areas. Mindset of the people is very bad we cannot be collecting waste from 
people who are not paying. As long as the mindset of people is not changed, even if 
we collect the waste, people’s mindset unchanged makes them throw the waste 
anyhow. 
Policy inconsistency: the policy does not provide good SWM practices that take care 
of health waste handlers and health of people. Focus in the current policy is more on 
keeping Zambia clean without highlighting practical risks poor waste management 
could cause to humans and the environment. For example, due to lack of awareness 
about SWM and environmental effects; people building houses around landfills have 
created new problems as they encroach landfill areas. Allowing people live in a place 
that will endanger them is very risk; some people are ignorant and that is when as 
LCC we should advise people on SWM risks to their health and other aspects of life. 
But ask me why we are not doing it? Political interest takes over everything. 
Removing or stopping people from building around landfills attract political 
‘muscles’ and we are let it be. We have ended up using courts in some cases and 
demolished homes built illegally. But by that time, politicians who supported the 
construction would have been voted out and left people to face the law on their own. 
Some people dig boreholes within landfill areas where water tables are likely to have 
been contaminated by waste in the landfills. All those are health risks they do not take 
into account. Private collectors come back to the LCC that people are not paying; the 
LCC is forced to do what CBEs are supposed to do because they cannot meet their 
roles. There is need to collaborate with stakeholders to harness SWM. The media is 
not doing much to ensure people are educated on SWM, the media is a good platform 
to some extent involve the people to educate them maybe they would be prompted to 
take interest in such matters and participate effectively in municipality SWM 
planning processes 
Communicative channels 
Community radio i.e. do programmes on community radio to educate people e.g. on 
radio Yatsani. People are able to call to put their thoughts across and we respond to 
them where we can and see how we can deal with things within our jurisdiction. 
Advertisements are the other ways of communicating. We put advertisements seeking 
public views on what the council is planning to do either in their communities or in 
other communities. The public response has been very low. People often shun 
responding to advertisements soliciting for their comments. “What else can we do, 
they are not willing to be engaged? We can’t force them; we have to do something 
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with or without their input.”  
 
Fast Track Court: The FCT is a means to communicate to the public about 
repercussions of noncompliance to SWM system, so we are getting the message 
across that “if you don’t comply the law will visit you.” The media covers such 
arrests; we are thus able to communicate it to others in other waste management 
zones. Since both electronic and print media give publicity to the prosecutions, it 
means the message get adequate dissemination. Unless someone does not listen or 
read news but even then there is chance those who did would tell them.  
 
Smart Zambia Campaign: We are moving steadily except we can't be everywhere at 
once. Talking of compounds also take note that these are informal developments, it is 
not easy to control things in such places because from inception there are no set 
standards of development people build anyhow and mostly without permission.  So it 
is important to have that background too. We introduced Smart Zambia Campaign to 
join hands with people in keeping the city clean. It was launched in October 
2015.What’s its projected life span? It will depend on public response, but we intend 
to make it part of our operations to go out once in two weeks to clean. People are 
communicated to through advertisements, as way to invite them to participate in the 
cleaning process 
 
Waste generation in Lusaka 
- Per/capita generated =350g/day/person in Lusaka & the estimated population 
for Lusaka we put it at 3m, we can’t over rule waste collectors’ failures as 
well,  
- Per capita per generate per person to find the amount waste generated per 
day 
- We also have data on the amount of waste we have received per day, then we 
find the difference, basically if our records and reports we have, we 
sometimes go beyond 50% collection and it changes  
 
Future plans?   
We are calling for enactment of a system where SWM fees can be bundled into other 
charges like we had it before, we need law to do so. In the past we had it but with 
politics it was removed and put separate. We had very beautiful cities in the past 
because the collection of waste fees was more effective. We had contractors who 
swept all streets and even when they did not find someone at home, they will mark 
the house and come back to collect a day or two later. If we had such a system, we 
will be policing waste collectors, not whereby CBEs have to see households first to 
tell them to pay for waste before collecting it. We have to improve the system of 
financing. 
 
How do you plan involve households and other actors more? WDCs are doing that 
already. They are in every WMD to create awareness and provide a link between 
actors at the grassroots and us (LCC). We created sub-structures below WMDs called 
zones to ensure people at the lowest level are involved in planning, monitoring and 
evaluation of exisitng SWM systems. Although there is politics in WDCs, there are 
the link we have with the people.We also want to see, maybe we can up with a policy 
to bind producers to follow the lifespan of their products i.e. where they follow their 
products packages to disposal points. The landfills are full, land in Lusaka is full, and 
we may extend the boundary of Lusaka to find space for dumping. LCC has requested 
the President to allow LCC to start dumping in Chongwe town which is about 35km 
east of Lusaka. Recycling is the way to avoid landfills getting full, even if we found 
new dumping sites, they will be full again thus recycling becomes more pertinent. We 
need to look at SWM in terms of recycling. 
 
7.3.1. Ward Development Committee –WDC 
CBEs go to households sensitizing them about SWM. They introduce themselves as 
the company assigned to collect waste from a given zone. We ensure that CBEs 
collect waste from their zones as part of the contract. We come in when there is a 
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problem, we only help CBEs when households are not paying .We had sensitization 
through door-to-door and giving them call outs for those who do not pay. We did the 
sensitizations with health inspectors, us (WDCs) and CBEs in company of police. We 
put CBE’s names on the data base and monitor their performance. In the past we had 
few CBEs, LCC has given us room to bring new companies. Currently 9 CBEs in 
Mtendere, plus 3 are new applicants; improvement will be seen when new CBEs 
come on board. With the increase in CBEs, collection would be better 
Households participation in planning for SWM, etc? 
CBEs go to people’s homes introducing themselves as collectors of waste in that zone 
and give them guidelines on how to pay and other logistics. CBEs are the ones who 
engage the people in a way they feel it works for them. We [WDCs] only get 
involved/facilitate talking between households and CBEs during door-to-door 
sensitization on SWM and give call outs for those who do not pay and take them to 
court – Fast Track Court (FTC). People call us whenever they know someone who is 
not paying and we go to them and ensure that they pay or take them to the police for 
keeping in the cells before we take them to court (FTC) the following day for 
prosecution. Those with complaints come to us although we are mobile as we are 
often in the field seeing what’s happening in the zone 
CBEs that are non-performing we recommend to LCC for cancellation of contract and 
obtain petition from households for cancellation back up. New CBEs have no spaces 
where to put waste bins. We have had one CBE in Zone C which is supposed to be 
managed by 3 people but there have been only one CBE. Most people apply to run 
CBEs, but they are not working, they fail to perform since waste collection is very 
involving; it’s very hard to manage there is always someone. The LCC train CBEs in 
waste management in a number areas before granting them permit to collect waste in 
a given zone 
Planning/participatory processes? 
We plan for the people and inform them on our decisions. We have an executive that 
plans for the wards/WMDs and zones as well. People present their issues to us and we 
pick it up to see how best to address them or engage other stakeholders who can help 
get over the matters. We entrusted CBEs to engage the public for them to appreciate 
waste management and improving the current status quo of waste management. CBEs 
are the ones who sensitize households on waste management, we only come in to 
enforce the law for those who don’t pay and illegally dump the waste. The CBEs give 
us lists of non-compliance households and force them to pay or they face the law.  
When there is a problem we (WDCs) come in to mediate. In case on non-payment we 
follow up and talk to people as individuals not as a group. CBEs give us lists of 
people who are not complying and we follow them up to tell them to pay. Those who 
do not pay, we give them call outs to appear before the court. We ensure that person 
pays, we take them to the CBE and make them pay for collection, and other fees for 
non-payment in the previous months or it they are taken to police they also pay a 
guilty fee to the police before being taken to court. If a household is arrogant, insult 
or confrontational to the CBE, we follow up and make them comply with them law or 
face an arrest 
Problems? Number of CBEs e.g. C section which requires 3 CBEs is managed by 
one CBE. Section C has more than 3000 households. CBE non performance due to 
non commitment to the duty since the work is too involving 
How can describe the current state of SWM? There is nothing wrong with it; 
except low numbers of CBEs in the area. We are waiting for new CBEs to be 
approved. The low number of CBEs is making effective waste collection hard and 
poorly executed hence making the waste management badly done. Some CBEs are 
not adequately collecting the waste. LCC is looking for new players to replace them.  
Waste collection is very involving, most CBEs give up when they realise how 
difficult it is to do the work. LCC train CBEs on proper waste management practices 
 
 
 
2. As above/
action on
noncompliance to
SWM systems/
FTC
 
3. Problematisati
on of SWM/
power to award
and cancel
contracts for
CBEs
4. Domination/
exclusion
 
 
 
5. Arbitration/
coercive actions
 
 
 
6. SWM
problematisation
7. Problematisati
on of SWM i.e. #
of CBEs/
information
sharing with
CBEs
 
52 
i.e. packaging, separation, disposal and other aspects that they need to know as they 
get into the waste management business.
Households complain when they are not happy with a particular CBE. We then 
discuss with the CBE to find out why and see how well we can help them. CBEs that 
fail to meet the waste collection targets are submitted to LCC for cancellation of their 
contract to collect the waste in a particular zone/district.  Our recommendation to 
cancel a CBE contract is often supported by residents’ petition in written or orally to 
avoid cases where a CBE unfairly loses its contract either due to a misunderstanding 
with the WDC or few people at the LCC. 
Trust? Some people are unreliable, therefore we have to use the law to make them 
comply. This place is a messy on Mondays; people throw the waste all over during 
weekend. They keep it in their homes waiting for weekend when we are not working. 
They do not want to pay for the waste, they want someone will do it for them. People 
throw the waste at the middle of the road, cars pass over the waste and it scatters all 
over. The CBEs collect the waste dumped anyhow, it is their zone. The same people 
will start complaining about waste; those who do not pay are the ones who complain 
more. They make so much noise, they to go MUVI TV [private TV station] or report 
to go to the member of parliament.  
How do you involve households you see making noise in the media? We visited 
them before with the LCC, CBEs and the police, we went to their homes talking to 
them, telling them things have changed, they have to pay to CBEs.  Some CBEs are 
also not straight forward, they do not work, they have other things to do and think 
running a CBE is one of the ventures they can earn extra income. We are forced to 
find means to collect the waste when CBEs do not do their work well. We call the 
director waste management and have it collected by the LCC. The ward councillor 
help us to have issues taken to the LCC  
What power do you have? We have power to award contracts to CBEs and have the 
contracts cancelled. It is us with the ward councillor who evaluate CBEs and award 
contracts and submit the names to the LCC. If the CBE is not performing, we get 
signatures as petition from households to attach to our recommendation to the LCC 
for the cancellation of the CBE’s contract. We also enforce the SWM by-laws by 
arresting and present to the LCC for prosecution households who not subscribe to 
SWM systems. We plan for households and CBEs and submit our consolidated ward 
development plans to the LCC for final decision making. Most of the things we put in 
the ward development plan appear in the final decisions made by the LCC. Not 
everything can pass the decision making process. There are things we are often not 
aware about when planning that are determinants of the decision making process. 
Since we do not sit in LCC meetings, except our bosses the ward councillors and 
Member of Parliament, we cannot know some things relevant to the planning process. 
We depend our bosses to give us feedback on priority areas. When we arrest 
someone, we ask the police to keep them for us and they pay admission fee of non 
subscription to SWM system. The following day we take them to the FTC. We 
process papers works and submit to the LCC the time the person we catch dumping 
waste illegally or doing something against SWM by-laws.“we do a lot. Like me, 
people call me always, I am always busy resolving issues” Sometimes households 
fight with CBEs, we [WDC executive members or ward councillor] have to 
intervene.We either sit them down or talk to them separately. We work with the 
bosses (ward councillors and MP) we report to them than we report to the LCC.  
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